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NOTE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS OF
DEPORTATION: SECTION 243(h) OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
ACT OF 1952
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 243(h)' of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(Act) provides:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion
the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion or
political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be
necessary for such reason.3
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1557 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act). For surveys of
immigration law, see C. GORDON & H. ROSENFMLD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
(1972, Supp. 1975); J. WASSERmAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1973).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970). The key words of the statutory language are
"authorized," "opinion," "within," and "persecution."
Significantly, the section is in Part V of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251-1260 (1970),
which concerns deportation and adjustment of status of aliens found within the United
States. Section 243, 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), sets forth the process of selection of the
country to which an alien may be deported. The section also makes provision for the
payment of deportation expenses, i.e. transportation costs. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(c) - (f)
(1970).
The deportable alien may designate a country to which he wishes to be deported. If
that country declines to accept the alien or does not respond to the Attorney General's
inquiries about accepting him, the Attorney General must order deportation to the
country of which the alien is a "subject, citizen, or national," provided that country
agrees to admit him. If that country refuses to accept the alien, the Attorney General
may then direct deportation to any of seven possible countries: (1) "the country from
which such alien last entered the United States;" (2) "the country in which is located the
foreign port at which such alien embarked for the United States or for foreign contiguous
territory;" (3) "the country in which he was born;" (4) "the country in which the place
of his birth is situated at the time he is ordered deported;" (5) "any country in which he
resided prior to entering the country from which he entered the United States;" (6) "the
country which had sovereignty over the birthplace of the alien at the time of his birth;"
or (7) "any country which is willing to accept such alien into its territory" if deportation
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Section 243(h) appears to create a means by which a refugee or
other alien, who is already within the United States, can avoid being
returned to a country in which he would be subject to persecution.4
Such an alien seeking 243(h) relief, however, is confronted with
a statute which vests great discretiona in the Attorney Gen-
to any of the countries in categories 1-6 is "impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible." 8
U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1970).
The alien must be notified of his right to apply for § 243(h) relief only with regard to
those countries specified by the Attorney General or his designate, the immigration judge
(formerly known as a special inquiry officer). 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1976). That is,
the alien is not entitled to notice of any right to apply for § 243 (h) relief from deporta-
tion to a country he has designated. An alien would not logically seek deportation to a
country where he would be persecuted unless he planned to raise his § 243(h) claim as a
delaying mechanism. The courts have not been sympathetic to such transparently dila-
tory tactics. See, e.g., Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, 209 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 320 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 955 (1963). In In re Sagasti, 13 I.
& N. Dec. 771, 773 (1971), however, the Board of Immigration Appeals suggested that
the special inquiry officer ask the alien whether he feared persecution in any of the
countries named "regardless of whether the country is 'designated' by the alien or 'speci-
fied' by the . . . officer" and then advise him of his right to seek § 243(h) relief from
deportation to "any named country." Finally, the special inquiry officer is under no
obligation to hear a § 243(h) claim about a country to which he does not intend to
order deportation. In re Niesel, 10 I. & N. Dec. 57, 59 (1962).
4. The section also includes the alien, already in the United States, whose na-
tive government changes or adopts policies that would subject him to persecution upon
his return. Moreover, since the section is part of the deportation procedure, which
contains an abundance of time-consuming procedural niceties, it offers many aliens the
opportunity to delay, but not avoid, deportation. See notes 51-68 infra and accompany-
ing text. For a classic example of the use of Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS or Service) and statutory procedures to delay deportation, see Schieber v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 520 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
5. See notes 34-50 infra and accompanying text. In Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d
874 (7th Cir. 1960), the court rejected the alien's argument that § 243(h) violated the
doctrine of separation of powers and thus was an unconstitutional delegation of the
legislative power. The court stated:
The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the political branches
of government, the legislative and executive, may be exercised entirely through
executive officers, 'with such opportunity for judicial review of their action as
Congress may see fit to authorize.'
Id. at 876.
On its face, § 243 (h) might appear either to preclude judicial review or involve matters
"committed to agency discretion by law." Administrative Procedure Act (APA) §
10(2), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1970). Such a construction of the section is reinforced
by the use of the word "opinion" and the absence of any requirement that the Attorney
General find that the alien will be persecuted. See notes 32-50 infra and accompanying
text. The APA's judicial review provisions, however, have not been applicable to judicial
review of § 243(h) cases since at least the adoption of § 106(a) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. 1105(a) (1970), in 1961, as construed in Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 375 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1963). See notes 69-77 infra and accompanying text. Even
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eral,' and the reported cases suggest that 243 (h) relief is not readily
obtained., Questions therefore arise about what factors motivate the
Attorney General to grant or withhold relief, the extent to which courts
before Foti, courts were reviewing the Attorney General's actions in § 243(h) cases to
determine whether the alien had been afforded procedural due process. See notes 90-96
infra and accompanying text. The courts also reviewed claims that the Attorney
General abused his discretion in denying an alien's request for relief from deportation.
See, e.g., Obrenovic v. Pilliod, supra; Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961). No court since Foi has suggested that judicial
review is precluded in § 243(h) cases. Indeed, some courts have broadened the scope of
review to include review of the evidence under the substantial evidence on the whole
record test. See notes 2C0-23 infra and accompanying text.
6. The Attorney General has delegated his discretion under the Act to the
Commissioner of the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1976). The Commissioner may redelegate
any of his received authority to employees of the INS, including immigration judges. Id.
There are certain occasions when the Attorney General may review cases decided by the
Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1976); note 66 infra and
accompanying text.
7. A careful distinction must be drawn between reported and unreported § 243(h)
decisions. The initial determination by the immigration judge is not published, although
portions of the officer's opinion infrequently appear in the published reports of a review-
ing body. The Board publishes some of its opinions. Since the great majority of
cases reviewed by the Board and the courts involve denial of relief, it is difficult to
determine from that record how often an alien successfully proves his claim of persecu-
tion before an immigration judge. The Board can reverse a judge's grant of relief.
See Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860
(1961). Moreover, the INS no longer releases information on the annual number of
§ 243(h) applications and their disposition. From 1953 through 1956, however, there
were 2,364 applications of which at least 738 were granted. PROCEEDINGS AND COM-
MrrrEE REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ASYLUM 114 n.272 (1967-1968), citing 1953 INS ANN. REP. 42-43,
1954 id, at 42, 1955 Id. at 18, and 1956 Id. at 16. Later Annual Reports provided fig-
ures only for the number of § 243(h) applications: 526 in 1963, 257 in 1965, 302 in
1966, 398 in 1967, and 530 in 1968. 1963 INS ANN. REP. 13; 1965 Id. at 14; 1966 Id.
at 19; 1967 Id. at 20; 1968 Id. at 20. The 1969 Annual Report merely noted that §
243(h) applications "decreased slightly" from the 1968 level. 1969 INS ANN. REP. 22.
The 1970-1973 Annual Reports contain no reference to § 243(h).
Most of the reported cases do not directly reveal the circumstances that motivate the
INS to grant § 243(h) relief. The cases do, however, show what is not sufficient to
procure a stay of deportation, and thus by inference what may be sufficient. See text
accompanying notes 231-63 infra. Finally, the forgoing figures do reveal that the
number of § 243(h) applications declined in the mid-1960's and then increased after the
section was amended and arguably liberalized in 1965. *See text accompanying notes 42-
49 infra. The number of reported cases has again declined in the 1970's, suggesting that
if the appeal rate on denied applications has remained constant, either the INS is
granting relief in more of the applications or fewer aliens are using § 243(h). Since
there is no evidence in the reported cases that the courts or the Board have relaxed
significantly the burden of persuasion on the applicant, the latter possibility seems more
probable. This observation in turn raises the question whether § 243(h) has become a
nullity for many aliens.
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may review his action, and thus what, if any, are -the judicially imposed
limits on the exercise of his discretion.s
This Note will explore these questions through a review of the legisla-
tive history of section 243(h) and an analysis of the reported casesY
Emphasis will be placed upon administrative practice, judicial review of
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Service) denials of
section 243(h) relief, and the kinds of claims raised under the section.
In addition, this Note will consider the place and function of the section
in the Act generally and the deportation provisions specifically. Finally,
attention will be given to the relationship of the section to the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,'0 adopted by the
United States in 1968, which incorporates the 1951 Geneva Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees."
1I. PRIOR AND CURRENT REFUGEE RELIEF STATUTES
Before the enactment of the Immigration Act of 191712 there were
few restrictions on entry to the United States;13 hence, there was little
need for specific provisions for past or potential victims of persecution.
The 1917 Act, however, limited entry to literate persons, although an
exception was made for illiterate persons fleeing religious persecution. 14
8. A refusal to grant a stay of deportation is as much a reviewable discretionary act
as the giving of such relief. But see quotation in text accompanying note 203 inlra.
9. See note 7 supra.
10. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
11. 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 19 U.S.T. 6264.
12. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. For a fuller discussion of the
1917 Act and the other statutes and some of the cases considered in this section of the
Note, see PROCEEDNGS AND CoMmrrrE REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOCIATION, LEGAL ASPECTS oF ASYLUM 64-73 (1967-1968).
13. But see Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (suspension of entry of
"Chinese laborers" for ten years).
14. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877. The section established
a literacy test for admission requiring the alien to be able to read thirty to forty words
in the language of his choice. The religious persecution exemption stated:
mhe following classes of persons shall be exempt from the operation of the
illiteracy test, to wit: All aliens who shall prove to the satisfaction of the
proper immigration officer or to the Secretary of Labor that they are seeking
admission to the United States to avoid religious persecution in the country of
their last permanent residence, whether such persecution be evidenced by overt
acts or by laws or governmental regulations that discriminate against the alien
or the race to which he belongs because of his religious faith ....
Id. Relief from the test was also given to the immediate relatives of citizens, resident
aliens, and legally admissible clients. Id.
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Deportable aliens15 generally had no statutory recourse for relief from
deportation until the Alien Registration Act of 1940.18 In the after-
math of World War II, with its attendant large population shifts,
changes of government, and the advent of the "cold war," the United
States reevaluated its policies toward refugees. Certain persons17 found
in Italy or sectors of Germany and Austria occupied by western Allied
forces were granted entry visas to the United States. 8 A "displaced
person" residing within the United States'9 could apply to the Attorney
15. By the Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565, 566-67, the Secretary of the
Treasury was empowered to deport aliens who had entered the country under prohibited
contracts to provide labor, provided such deportation occurred Within a year of entry.
Section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 889, provided for the
deportation of certain legally admitted aliens within five years of entry. Aliens who had
entered illegally had to be deported within three years of entry.
16, Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670. Before 1940, deportation
was mandatory; that is, there were no forms of discretionary relief for deportable aliens.
The 1940 Act permitted voluntary departure for aliens of "good moral character." In
some cases in which the alien was closely related to a citizen or resident alien,
deportation could be suspended. Id. at 672. In 1943, the 1917 Immigration Act was
amended to give the Attorney General some latitude in choosing the country to which an
alien would be deported:
If the United States is at war and the deportation. . . of any alien. . . shall
be found by the Attorney General to be impracticable or inconvenient because
of enemy occupation of the country whence such alien came or wherein is lo-
cated the foreign port at which he embarked for the United States or because
of other reasons connected with the war, such alien may, at the option of the
Attorney General, be deported (a) if such alien is a citizen or subject of a
country whose recognized government is in exile, to the country wherein is lo-
cated the government in exile, if that country will permit him to enter its ter-
iitory: or (b) if such alien is a citizen or subject of a country whose recognized
government is not in exile, then, to a country or any political or territorial sub-
division thereof which is proximate to the country of which the alien is a citi-
zen or subject, or, with the consent of the country of which the alien is a citi-
zen or subject, to any other country.
Act of July 13, 1943, ch. 230, 57 Stat. 553.
17. These persons included citizens of the Axis countries who had been victims of
persecution and citizens of other countries found in Germany, Austria, or Italy as a
result of population movements after the beginning of the war. Displaced Persons Act
of 1948, ch. 647, § 2(c), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009-10. The Act established a series of visa
preferences, including one for those persons who had fought against the Axis countries
but were "unable or unwilling to ieturn to the countries of which they are nationals be-
cause of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political
opinions." A second preference was given to persons living in refugee camps. Id. § 7,
62 Stat. 1009, 1012. Additionally, the 1948 Act provided visas for citizens of Czecho-
slovakia who had left their country after January 1, 1948, "as a result of persecution or
fear of persecution. Id., § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1009, 1010.
18. Id. The Act created 202,000 entry visas in addition to those permitted under
the 1917 Act's quotas. Id., § 3(a), 62 Stat. 1009, 1010.
19. A "displaced person residing in the United States" was defined as a person who
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General for adjustment of his immigration status,20 provided the alien
could prove that he was unable or unwilling to return to his native
country "because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of
race, religion or political opinions."21  Two years later, in 1950, the
predecessor of section 243(h) was added to the Immigration Act of
1917.22
had lawfully entered the country and had been
displaced from the country of his birth, or nationality, or of his last residence
as a result of events subsequent to the out-break of World War II [and could
not] return to any of such countries because of persecution or fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion or political opinions.
Id., § 4(b), 62 Stat. 1009, 1011.
20. The section covering displaced persons already in the United States applied only
to individuals who had entered the country as nonimmigrants or nonquota immigrant
students. Id.
21. Id. This language in § 4(b) of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 should be
compared with that of § 243(h). See text accompanying note 3 supra. Arguably, the
inclusion of "fear of persecution" would require a lighter burden of persuasion than
"persecution" alone. See note 23 infra (similar language in § 2(a) of the Refugee Relief
Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400).
The leading case under the 1948 Act was Lavdas v. Holland, 139 F. Supp. 514 (E.D.
Pa. 1955), affd, 235 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1956). An alien had left a small Greek island
at age 18 because he feared conscription by Communist insurgents. While living
on the island he had not been politically active. To support his claim of a fear of
persecution, the alien introduced letters written five years before the 1955 deportation
hearing in which several residents of the island stated their opinions, without supporting
evidence, that he would be persecuted by the Communists if he returned to the island.
235 F.2d at 956-57.
The special inquiry officer of the INS rejected the petitioner's claim on the grounds
that any persecution would be the result of action by the Communist party, not thc
government. On appeal, petitioner raised the issue whether the persecution contemplated
by the Act necessarily had to be at the hands of a government. Neither the district
court nor the court of appeals found it necessary to decide the question, although the
former suggested in dictum that even if the petitioner's fear were well grounded, such
reprisals were not sufficient to meet the statutory requirement. 139 F. Supp. at 515.
Both courts took judicial notice of the decrease of insurgent activities and the establish.
ment of a stable government in Greece by 1953. 139 F. Supp. at 515; 235 F.2d at 957.
Consequently, the two courts declined to give credence to the alien's evidence of
possible persecution five or six years previously. Both also noted that there was no
evidence that the petitioner would be persecuted anywhere in Greece other than his
native island. 139 F. Supp. at 515; 235 F.2d at 957. The court of appeals found the
alien's claim particularly unconvincing since he had left the island at an early age
without any history of political activity. 235 F.2d at 957.
See cases cited notes 232, 242 & 248 infra and accompanying text (similar reasoning
by the courts and the INS in § 243(h) cases). It is important to note, however, that
Lavdas was decided five years after the adoption of the predecessor of § 243(h). See
note 22 infra and accompanying text. There is no evidence that considerations such as
those in Lavdas were before the Congress in 1950 or 1952.
22. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010, amending
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Between 1952 and 1965 Congress used a variety of techniques for
handling the problems of admitting refugees to the United States;23
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 20, 39 Stat 874, 890-91, as amended, Act of July
13, 1943, ch. 230, 57 Stat. 553; see note 16 supra. The provision read: "No alien shall
be deported under any provisions of this Act to any country in which the Attorney
General shall find that such alien would be subject to physical persecution." Id.
(emphasis added). See notes 33 & 93 infra and accompanying text (legislative history
and cases).
23. In addition to § 243(h), the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §
212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970), gives the Attorney General discretion to
parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may pre-
scribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest
any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such
alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes
of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he
was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.
This section was used to facilitate the entry of Hungarian refugees in 1956-57. These
Hungarian parolees were later granted permanent resident status by the Act of July 25,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419. Most recently, the parole provision of the Act
was used to permit the admission of Indochinese refugees after the collapse of American-
spported regimes in Cambodia and South Vietnam. See Comment, Refugee-Parolee:
The Dilemma of the Indochina Refugee, 13 SAN DEGo L. REv. 175 (1975).
In 1953, after the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Congress enacted
the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400, which was amended by the Act of
Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1169, 68 Stat. 1044. This act provided visas, in excess of those
allowed under the quota system, for "refugees," defined as one who was "out of his usual
place of abode and unable to return thereto" due to "persecution, fear of persecution,
natural calamity or military operations" and who sought entry to the United States from
a non-Communist country. The act also covered "escapees" who were defined as persons
who had fled a Communist country due to "persecution or fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion." Id., § 2(a), (b), 67 Stat. 400. The Act
pro% ided a mechanism by means of congressional resolutions for the adjustment of the
status of aliens lawfully in the United States who showed that they could not return to
the country of their "birth, or nationality, or last residence, because of persecution or
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." Id., § 6, 67 Stat.
400, 403.
D'Antonio v. Shaughnessy, 139 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), held that the Refugee-
Relief Act included both governmental and private acts of persecution. The petitioners,
who uere Italian nationals, claimed that they feared persecution by Italian Communists.
Id. at 720-2 1. The court compared § 6 with § 243 (h) (which was then limited to "physi-
cal persecution," see text accompanying note 38 infra), and reasoned that the inclusion
of nonphysical persecution and "fear of persecution" in § 6 "reflect[ed] a liberal and
remedial purpose on the part of Congress; and it should be construed to effectuate that
purpose." Id. at 722-23. Later cases interpreted §. 6 liberally. See, e.g., Leong Leun
Do v. Esperdy, 309 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1962) (alien granted relief if he was unable to
return to one of three countries described by § 6 for reasons of persecution and if
he could not return to the other countries for nonpersecutory reasons); Cheng Lee King
v. Carnahan, 253 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1958); Chung Can Foo v. Brownell, 148 F. Supp.
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some of those provisions were consolidated in section 203 (a) (7)24 of
the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
That current refugee relief provision of the Act is clearly of limited
scope since it applies only to aliens outside the United States. Moreover,
it is unavailable to persons fleeing persecution in many parts of the world,
such as the Western Hemisphere, the Indian subcontinent, Africa, and
noncommunist portions of Asia. The Supreme Court has further re-
stricted the reach of the section by construing it to be unavailable to
persons who, having fled one country, have lived in another for more
than a brief period before seeking entry to the United States. 20 For the
alien-refugee already legally or illegally in the United States, section
243 (h) remains, perhaps, the only means of obtaining asylum.20
420 (D.D.C. 1957) (seamen on United States flag ships outside the United States
entitled to relief under § 6 if otherwise qualified); Shia Han Sun v. Barber, 144 F.
Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (same).
By the Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 1, 74 Star. 504, Congress permitted
parole into the United States of "refugee-escapees" who were residing in a noncommu-
nist country of which they were not nationals and who were receiving assistance from
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Refugee-escapees" had been
defined in 1957 as certain persons from Communist countries or the Middle East. Act
of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 15(c), 71 Stat. 639, 642-44.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970) provides:
Conditional entries shall next be made available by the Attorney General,
pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe and in a number not to exceed
6 per centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) (ii) of this title, to
aliens who satisfy an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer at an ex-
amination in any non-Communist or non-Communist-dominated country, (A)
that (i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, re-
ligion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any Communist or Commu-
nist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within the general
area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such
country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion, and (iii) are
not nationals of the countries or areas in which their application for condi-
tional entry is made; or (B) that they are persons uprooted by catastrophic
natural calamity as defined by the President who are unable to return to their
usual place of abode. For the purpose of the foregoing the term "general area
of the Middle East" means the area between the including (1) Libya on the
west, (2) Turkey on the north, (3) Pakistan on the east, and (4) Saudi Arabia
and Ethiopia on the south: Provided, That immigrant visas in a number not
exceeding one-half the number specified in this paragraph may be made avail-
able, in lieu of conditional entries of a like number, to such aliens who have
been continuously physically present in the United States for a period of at
least two years prior to application for adjustment of status.
25. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971).
26. Although the number of § 243(h) claims apparently is small, see note 7 supra, a
total of 30,907 refugees were admitted to the United States in 1973 under the other
provisions of the Act described in note 23 supra. Of these, 20,634, or over two-thirds,
were from Cuba. (Cuban parolees may seek adjustment of their status to that of a
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Ill. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 243 (h)
The apparently limited reach of section 243(h), when taken with its
discretionary character, raises the question whether Congress intended
the section to afford significant relief to persons seeking asylum in the
United States.27  The sparse and ambiguous legislative history of the
section provides little information for an answer.
Presumably, in 1950 Congress was aware of the language in the
Displaced Persons Act of 194828 about the "persecution" and "fear of
persecution" of refugees. Congress also had before it a lengthy report
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, setting out the results of an
investigation of the immigration system.29 The report described an
informal INS administrative practice of withholding the entry of a
permanent resident when they fulfill the requirements of the Act of Nov. 2, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161). The majority of the remaining refugees were from
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Spain. STATISTICAL ABSTiCT OF THE UNIrrFD
STATES 101 (1974). These figures underscore the selectivity of the refugee provisions of
the Act. Section 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970), see note 23 supra, can
be used to accommodate large numbers of persons displaced from a particular country, as
in the cases of the Hungarian, Cuban, and Indochinese refugees. Although § 243(h) is
not designed to reach such large scale population shifts, it is arguably the only refugee-
relief portion of the Act that on its face does not discriminate on the basis of national
origin. Thus, it is crucially important to many individual refugees.
It is, of course, possible to argue that § 243(h) is not a refugee-relief measure at all.
That is, the section is not intended to accommodate persons or groups actively fleeing
persecution; rather, it is designed to meet the needs of isolated individuals already in the
country who may not, originally, have been motivated by persecution to flee their native
countries. This argument, however, is based upon a narrow definition of "refugee,"
which looks to the reasons for leaving a country rather than the reasons for avoiding a
return to it. It is better to classify a person as a refugee at the time-and for as long
as--his remaining in or returning to his country of birth or citizenship becomes
problematic for reasons of potential physical, political, religious, economic, racial or
other objective persecution. Given this definition of "refugee," § 243(h) is clearly
a refugee-relief statute.
27. More generally, § 243(h) and the other refugee-relief sections of the Act raise
the question whether meaningful provisions for asylum are compatible with a quota
system that severely limits entry to this country. A fundamental tension exists between
the largely economically-motivated exclusionary provisions of the Act and the nation's
presumed public ideology of protecting political and religious freedoms. Given the
national practice prior to the adoption of limits on immigration, it is difficult to argue
that such an ideology finds meaning only within the boundaries of the country. This
tension is further exacerbated by the requirements of foreign policy; the realpolitik
imperatives of a world power undercut both the public ideology and the practical effect
of the refugee provisions.
28. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
29. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
Washington University Open Scholarship
68 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:59
deportation order if the alien would be subject to "political persecution"
in the country to which he would be deported.80 The report specifically
noted that such aliens had no statutory right to asylum in the United
States."' With at least this information before it, Congress amended the
Immigration Act of 1917 to require the Attorney General to suspend
deportation when he found that an alien would be subjected to physical
persecution in the country to which he would be returned. 2 No
attempt was made in the statute or accompanying House and Senate
reports to explain the function or purpose of the section or to define
"physical persecution." 33
When the immigration laws were extensively revised in 1952, 4 sec-
tion 243(h) was first proposed in a form that required a suspension of
deportation to any country where the Attorney General "shall in his
discretion find" that the alien would be subject to physical persecution.8"
30. Id. at 640. The Report stated that the alien was usually given twelve months to
make a voluntary departure from the United States, although the period could be
extended. It was estimated that this practice involved forty or fifty cases a year. Id.
31. Id.
32. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 87, amending the
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 20, 39 Stat. 874, as amended, Act of July 13, 1943,
ch. 230, 57 Stat. 553. See text quoted note 22 supra.
Four elements of this predecessor of § 243 (h) should be noted. First, the Attorney
General was required to suspend deportation if he made a finding of physical persecu-
tion. Suspension was not, therefore, entirely discretionary. Second, the section mandat-
ed a suspension of deportation as opposed to the stay of deportation provided in § 243
(h). Arguably a stay is more temporary than a suspension. Third, the Attorney General
had to make a finding of physical persecution. Thus, he had to make provisions for
evidentiary hearings and other procedural formalities which were another curb on
discretion. Fourth, a suspension could be granted only upon a finding of physical
persecution. This requirement was in contrast with the provisions of the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, see notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text, which spoke of
"persecution" and "fear of persecution."
33. The only reference to the section in the legislative history is remarkably
unilluminating: "It is further provided that no alien shall be deported to any country in
which the Attorney General finds that such alien would be subjected to physical
persecution." H.R. REP. No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1950).
34. The revision produced the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1557 (1970).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1952). The proposed text
read: "No alien shall be deported under any provisions of this Act to any country in
which the Attorney General shall in his discretion find that such alien would be
subjected to physical persecution."
The conflict between a required suspension and a discretionary finding is obvious.
Equally anomalous is the concept of a discretionary finding. The significance of the
proposed language is its indication that Congress early intended to give the Attorney
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During the extensive legislative hearings on the 1952 Act, several wit-
nesses urged that proposed section 243(h) be amended to specify
clearly that relief could be given when the persecution was a result of the
alien's race, religion, or political beliefs . 6  No such changes were
adopted, but when the section emerged from Conference Committee, it
had been significantly altered:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion
the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such period
of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.37
The conference report contained no explanation of these changes.38
Clearly, however, this language, which was enacted by Congress, 9
greatly enhanced the Attorney General's discretion in granting relief.4 0
He was merely "authorized," not required, to stay deportation; the
finding requirement was replaced by the much more flexible provision
for an "opinion. '41  Once more, the legislative history gave no defini-
tion of the term "physical persecution."
When the Act was amended in 1965, section 243(h) was again
subjected to brief consideration and significant modification. During
the legislative hearings on the various amendments to the Act, at least
two witnesses recommended that the word "physical" be deleted because
it established too restrictive a standard.42 One witness also urged that
General more discretion in granting relief than he was allowed under the 1950 amend-
ments to the Immigration Act of 1917. See notes 22 & 32 supra.
36. Joint Hearings on S. 716, H.R. 2379 & H.R. 2816 before House Judiciary
Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 449, 539-40, 628, 681 (1952). The witnesses represented the
Americans for Democratic Action, the National Council of Jewish Women, the Common
Council for American Unity, and the Association of Immigration and Nationality Law-
yers. The witnesses appear not to have been concerned about the quality of the persecu-
tion (i.e. whether it was physical or nonphysical), but with the causes of the persecution.
Mrs. Effenbein of the National Council of Jewish Women asked that the section include
"discrimination" as well as persecution. She further stated that the Council believed
that
aliens should not be deported to countries where they have no emotional or
cultural ties, and where, because of economic inequalities in this world, they
might through our instrumentality be placed in situations comparable to slave
labor.
Id. at 539-40.
37. H.R. REP. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1952).
38. Id.
39. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214.
40. The courts quickly recognized this increased discretion. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1953).
41. For an early discussion of the significance of these changes, see id.
42. Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of
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the standard of section 243(h) be changed to the alien's "well-founded
fear of persecution, '43 so that 243(h) would better comport with the
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.44 When
the section was reported to the floor of the House, the only change from
its 1952 version was the removal of the word "physical;" the accompa-
nying House Report laconically noted that "techniques of persecution
are not limited to bodily violence alone." 5
On the floor, however, Representative Poff offered a prepared
amendment which added the phrase "on account of race, religion or
political opinion" after the word "persecution. ' 4  Noting that the pro-
posed bill deleted the word "physical," Mr. Poff stated:
I can understand and appreciate the purpose of this change. The
clause "physical persecution" is entirely too narrow. It is almost
impossible for the alien under an order of deportation to assemble the
quantum of evidence necessary to discharge his burden of proof.
On the other hand, I suggest that the word "persecution" standing
alone may be too broad in concept and too flexible in definition. It
seems to me that between these two extremes there should be some
reasonable middle ground. My amendment seeks to approach that
middle ground. First it broadens beyond the boundaries of physical
persecution but it narrows the word "persecution" by limiting the scope
of its interpretation to three specifics; namely persecution on account of
race, persecution on account of religion, or persecution on account of
political opinion. 4r
Representative Poff added that his amendment brought section 243(h)
into verbal conformity with section 203(a)(7).48 The amendment
passed without further comment or debate.49
This legislative history gives only vague clues to the congressional
purpose in enacting and amending section 243(h). In 1952 Congress
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 535, 887 (1965). The
two witnesses represented the American Friends Service Committee and the Association
of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers.
43. Id. at 535; Hearings on H.R. 2580 Before Subcommittee No. I of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1965).
44. 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 19 U.S.T. 6264.
45. H.R. Rm,. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1965).
46. 111 Cong. Rec. 21802 (1965) (amendment offered by Representative Poff).
47. Id. at 21804 (remarks by Representative Poff).
48. Id. For the text of § 203(a) (7), 8 U.S.C. §, 1153(a)(7) (1970), see note 24
supra.
49. For the text of § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970), see text accompanying
note 3 supra.
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obviously desired to extend the scope of the Attorney General's discre-
tion and eliminate the need for a finding. In 1965 Congress intended
to recognize some forms of persecution beyond those that were merely
physical. Indeed, Representative Poff s language suggests that he and
Congress sought to expand the kind and amount of evidence an alien
could introduce by enlarging the classes of persecution for which relief
might be granted. But while the 1965 amendments might thus be
construed to have liberalized section 243(h), there is no indication of
any congressional intent to change the alien's burden of persuasion,
which, although unarticulated in the section or its legislative history,
had, by 1965, been shown in reported cases to be very onerous.50 Given
this important absence of change and the continuation of the Attorney
General's great discretion, it is readily arguable that although Congress
expanded the kinds of persecution contemplated by section 243 (h) it did
little to alter the practical effect of the section's operation.
50. See notes 181-99 infra and accompanying text. "Burden of persuasion" and
"quantum of evidence" are used interchangeably throughout this Note; technically, the
latter defines the extent of the former.
If § 243(h) is construed to vest broad discretion in the Attorney General, then it
might be fallacious to speak of any burden of persuasion on an alien. Presumably,
under an expansive construction of the section, evidence that satisfied even the most
rigorous burden of persuasion would not guarantee the grant of relief, while in other
cases a stay might be granted on little or no evidence. Although the forgoing statement
is extreme, it does not present a logically impossible result under the section, especially
given the uncertainty about the reach and standards of judicial review for abuse of ad-
ministrative discretion. See notes 152-80 infra and accompanying text. See also text
accompanying note 86 infra.
It is unlikely, however, that a court would construe the section to vest such extensive
discretion in the Attorney General. Since the section affects important individual
interests, and since Congress must have enacted and amended § 243 (h) to provide relief
for at least some aliens, it is arguable that the Attorney General's discretion is limited
and that his actions are subject to some degree of judicial review. The problem thus
becomes determining for which aliens relief is or should be provided. At this juncture,
considerations of the burden of persuasion are relevant. A distinction must be drawn,
however, between the burden of persuasion the alien must satisfy before the Attorney
General and the judicial review thereof. See notes 181-98 infra and accompanying text.
if, as argued here, § 243(h) does not give the Attorney General unlimited discretion and
judicial review is not precluded, see note 5 supra, then that review must be made per-
suant to identifiable standards, including some means of considering the alien's evidence
and its evaluation by the agency. It follows that the agency should have its own
uniformly applied standards for weighing the alien's evidence.
In practice, the courts have attempted to articulate the burden of persuasion the
alien must meet. See notes 185-96 infra and accompanying text. Some courts have also
reviewed the alien's evidence under the substantial evidence test. See notes 200-23
infra and accompanying text.
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IV. STATUTORY MECHANICS OF SECTION 243(h)
The operation of section 243(h) must be understood in its statutory
context. Since the section is found in the deportation chapter of the
Act, r ' it is not available to persons who are excludable" from the
United States or to persons admitted to the country on conditional entry
permits or on parole.58 To satisfy the section's requirement that he be
"within the United States," the alien must have entered the country,
legally or illegally. "Entry" is a word of art in the Act; it requires
51. See note 3 supra.
52. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Dong Wing Ott v.
Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1957). Excludable aliens are defined in great detail
in § 212(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1970). They include aliens who are
mentally defective, insane, sexual deviates, drug addicts, chronic alcholics, paupers,
polygamists, prostitutes, anarchists, or communists, as well as aliens who have been
convicted of crimes of "moral turpitude," aliens who have been previously deported, and
aliens who fall within many other conditions or statutes. Exclusion procedures are set
forth in § 236 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1970), and 8 C.F.R. § 236 (1976).
By its terms, § 243(h) is not available to excludable aliens who are not considered to
be "within the United States." See, e.g., Long May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958);
United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967); Wong Hing Goon
v. Brownell, 264 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1959).
53. Section 203(a) (7) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970), see text quoted
note 24 supra, and § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970), see text quoted note 23
supra, provide two means by which aliens may be granted conditional or paroled entry
into the country. Many cases also arise under § 252 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1282 (1970),
which provides for the conditional entry of alien seamen. In an early case, United
States ex rel. Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the court held that
a seaman, who had made a legal conditional entry under the section and then had his
permit revoked, was entitled to apply for 243(h) relief. Thereafter, the Attorney
General issued regulations granting similarly-situated seamen hearings on their claims:
Any alien crewman refused a conditional landing permit or whose conditional
landing permit has been revoked who alleges that he cannot return to a Com-
munist, Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied country because of fear
of persecution in that country on account of race, religion, or political opinion
shall be removed from the vessel or aircraft for interrogation. Following the
interrogation, the district director having jurisdiction over the area where the
alien crewman is located may in his discretion authorize parole of the alien
crewman into the United States under the provisions of section 212(d) (5) of
the Act. If parole is not authorized, the crewman shall be returned to the ves-
sel or aircraft on which he arrived in the United States.
8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f) (1976). The countries encompassed by this regulation are far fewer
than those within the scope of § 243 (h). Later cases explicitly rejected or failed to
follow the Szlaimer rationale. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S.
62 (1969) (seamen with revoked entry permit not "within" the United States; 8 C.F.R. §
253.1(e), now § 253.1(f), comports with the Act and provides the alien with procedural
due process); Vucinic v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 243 F. Supp.
113 (D. Ore. 1965); Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F. Supp. 24 (S.D. Tex. 1963), afj'd, 340
F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1964).
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physical presence in the country plus inspection and "admission by an
immigration officer" or "actual and intentional evasion of inspection at
the nearest inspection point."'54 In addition, the alien must be free from
restraint while in the country; for example, he must not be in custody,
under surveillance, or admitted on parole.55
Deportation of an alien who has entered the United States may occur
for the reasons set forth in section 241 of the Act.56 Deportation
procedures are prescribed in section 242 of the Act57 and the corre-
sponding sections of the Code of Federal Regulations.58  The process
begins when the alien is served with an order to appear before an
immigration judge of the INS and show cause why he should not be
deported. 9 At the hearing, the alien has the right to be represented by
counsel, but not at government expense.60 A finding that the alien is
54. Matter of Pierre, Interim Decision No. 2238, at 3 (Oct. 5, 1973), citing United
States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954), Lazarescu v. United States, 199 F.2d
898 (4th Cir. 1952), United States ex rel. Giacone v. Corsi, 64 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1933),
and Morini v. United States, 21 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 623
(1928).
55. Matter of Pierre, Interim Decision No. 2238, at 4 (Oct. 5, 1973), citing United
States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3rd Cir. 1954), and Lazarescu v. United States,
199 F.2d 898, (4th Cir. 1952). Pierre involved a small, overloaded boat of per-
sons fleeing Haiti. They were rescued, nearly drowned, by a ship enroute to the
United States. Instead of evading the INS inspectors, the refugees remained on the ship
when it reached Florida where the inspectors determined that the Haitians were without
entry visas and hence inadmissible. They were thus denied relief under § 243(h), for
although they were in the United States, they had not entered the country. That is,
being in the United States is not equivalent to being "within" the United States. The
Board did note that applicants for admission to the United States and excluded aliens
could present evidence of feared persecution to the district director of the INS under §
212(d) (5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970), and 8 C.F.R. § 121.5(a) (1973).
Interim Decision No. 2238, at 6.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970). The grounds for deportation are numerous and involve
behavior or status both before and after entry into the country. See generally Wasser-
man, Grounds and Procedures Relating to Deportation, 13 SAN DrEao L. Ruv. 125
(1975).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970).
58. 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1976).
59. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (1976). Generally, the hearing will occur no less than seven
days after the issuance of the order. Id. At any time after the beginning of the
deportation process, the alien may be apprehended and placed in custody upon the
issuance of a warrant of arrest at the discretion of the district director. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2
(1976). Before the commencement of the hearing, the alien may apply for permission
to depart the country voluntarily. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1976).
60. 8 C.F.R. § 242.10 (1976). The hearing is conducted by a special inquiry officer
(more recently labelled an immigration judge, see 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(e) (1976)). This
officer has authority to determine deportability, order deportation, grant relief under §
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deportable must be supported by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence. 61 During the hearing the alien must be advised of his right to
apply for section 243(h) relief from deportation to countries specified
by the immigration judge.62  The alien may then be granted no more
than ten days within which to make an application. 63  The application
shall consist of respondent's 64 statement setting forth the reasons in
support of his request. The respondent shall be examined under oath
on his application and may present such pertinent evidence or informa-
tion as he has readily available. The respondent has the burden of
satisfying the special inquiry officer that he would be subject to
243(h), and certify his decisions to the Board for review. 8 C.F.R. § 242.8 (1976).
Another immigration officer, known as the trial attorney, may be assigned to the hearing
to present evidence in behalf of the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 242.9 (1976).
It is significant to note that the special inquiry officers are a particularly overburdened
lot. It is estimated that there are as many as eight million aliens illegally in the United
States. St. Louis Post Dispatch, Feb. 23, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 1 (Statement of Commis-
sioner of the INS). In Fiscal Year 1973, 655,968 deportable aliens were located in the
United States. (88 per cent of the total were Mexican.) 568,005 of these aliens were
required to depart without the issuance of a formal deportation order. Of the remainder,
42,054 cases were referred to special inquiry officers for hearings which represents a
doubling of referrals in five years. The officers also held 1,743 exclusion hearings in
fiscal 1973. In the same period the Board received 2,060 applications for review. 1973
INS ANN. REP. 9, 15-16. During Fiscal Year 1972, the INS employed 31 special inquiry
officers (a decrease of 3 from 1964) and 25 trial attorneys. No increase in staff was
planned for fiscal 1973. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comn. on Govern-
ment Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 40 (1973).
61. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966); 8 C.F.R. §
242.14(a) (1976). In Woodby, the Court construed § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252
(b)(4) (1970), which states: "No decision of deportability shall be valid unless it
is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence." The Court said that the
word "valid" indicated that the standard established the scope of judicial review, not the
burden of proof upon the INS. Noting the "drastic deprivations that may follow when a
resident of this country is compelled by our government to forsake all the bonds formed
here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary identification," the
Court required that clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence support a deportation
order. 385 U.S. at 285, 286 (emphasis added).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1976). See note 3 supra. If the alien elects to claim
asylum under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, see notes
264-99 infra and accompanying text, rather than § 243(h), different procedures apply.
See Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583, 586-87 nn.6-8 (D.N.J. 1975), re-
printing INS Operations Instructions 01 108.1(f)(1)-(3). If an alien's request for
asylum under the Protocol is rejected, he still may seek § 243(h) relief. 389 F. Supp.
at 587 n.8.
63. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1976).
64. The alien is known as the "respondent" during the proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §
242.1(a) (1976).
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persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion as
claimed."5
If the immigration judge's decision on the application is adverse, the
alien is allowed ten days to file an appeal with the Board of Immigration
Appeals (Board)."' The respondent alien may also file a motion to
reopen his deportation or 243 (h) hearing to present new evidence. 67
Motions to reopen a deportation hearing to make an initial 243(h)
application are sharply limited if the original ten day period for filing a
243(h) claim has passed. 68
V. JUDICIAL RE iEw
A. Jurisdiction for Review
Under section 106(a) of the Act an alien may seek review by a court
of appeals of a final deportation order, 69 provided he has exhausted his
65. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1976).
66, 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1976). See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1976) for the appellate
jurisdiction of the Board. The Board may also hear cases by certification from any
officer of the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1976). Although Board decisions are generally
final. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2) (1976), cases can be reviewed by the Attorney General when
he so directs or when requested by the Chairman or majority of the Board or the
Commissioner of the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1976).
67. 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1976) provides that a
motion to reopen will not be granted unless the special inquiry officer is satis-
fied that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and
could not have been discovered or presented at the hearing ....
68. 8 C.F.R. 242.17(c) (1976) states that no
motion to reopen for the purpose of providing the respondent with an oppor-
tunity to make an application under 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 be granted if respond-
ent's right to make such application was fully explained to him by the special
inquiry officer, and he was afforded an opportunity to do so at the hearing,
unless circumstances have arisen thereafter on the basis of which the request
is being made.
The Board also rarely grants motions to reopen to apply for discretionary relief. See 8
C.F.R. § 3.2 (1976).
69. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1970). This
review must be sought within six months of the entry of the final order. Orders of the
immigration judges are final except in the cases of appeal or certification to the Board, 8
C.F.R. § 242.20 (1976), in which event the Board's decision is final unless reviewed by
the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2), (h) (1) (1976); see note 66 supra.
Section 106(a) was added to the Act in 1961. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-
301, 75 Stat. 651. Before then, judicial review of deportation orders and discretionary
relief began in district courts. Section 243(h) cases were often habeas corpus proceed-
ings or actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. In 1955, the Supreme Court made
the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1952), applicable to deportation proceedings. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48
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administrative remedies.70  Review is upon the whole administrative
record on which the deportation order is based; the Attorney General's
findings of fact are conclusive if supported by "reasonable, substantive,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. 7 1
Although section 106(a) is clearly applicable to the judicial review of
final deportation orders, the circuits split, shortly after the section's
adoption in 1961, on the issue whether it gave the courts original
jurisdiction for review of denials of discretionary relief 2 that were ancil-
lary to the deportation determination.73  Jn Foti v. Immigration &
Naturalization Services4 the Supreme Court resolved the split by hold-
ing that judicial review of discretionary suspensions of deportation
under section 244(a)75 was placed in the courts of appeal by section
(1955). By using these provisions and repeated habeas corpus actions, aliens could
delay deportation for years. For a discussion of such dilatory tactics and how they
motivated Congress to enact § 106(a), see Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
375 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1963).
Section 106(a) establishes a mechanism for judicial review of deportation proceedings
and precludes the application of the Administrative Procedure Act in that area. Section
106(a) does not, however, apply to other portions of the Act. Section 106(a)(9), 8
U.S.C. § 1105(a)(9) (1970), does permit an alien "held in custody pursuant to an
order to deportation" to obtain judicial review of his custody in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding. In his petition, however, the alien must indicate whether the validity of his
deportation order has been upheld in any prior judicial proceeding, civil or criminal. If
it has been upheld, the petition will not be entertained unless new grounds are alleged
or the prior proceeding was inadequate. 8 U.S.C. § 1106(c) (1970).
70. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(c) (1970).
71. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1970).
72. Other forms of discretionary relief include the suspension of deportation and
adjustment of status to permanent resident for certain classes of aliens who have been
continuously present in the United States for seven or ten years, Immigration and
Nationality Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970), quoted in note 75 infra;
permission to make a voluntary departure (unlike the alien who is deported, one making
a voluntary departure may later legally reenter the country), Immigration and National-
ity Act § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1970); and adjustment of the status of a legally
admitted nonimmigrant to that of a permanent resident, Immigration and Nationality
Act § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1970).
73. Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd,
375 U.S. 217 (1963) (§ 106(a) did not confer original jurisdiction on the courts of
appeals for review of § 244(a) discretionary relief); Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th
Cir. 1962) (§ 106(a) did grant courts of appeals original jurisdiction in § 243(h) dis-
cretionary relief cases).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970):
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in
his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien un-
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies
to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and-
(a) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions
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106(a) .71 Then, in dictum the court added:
[I]t seems rather clear that all determinations made during and
incident to the administrative proceedings conducted by a special
inquiry officer, and reviewable together by the Board of Immigration
Appeals, such as orders denying voluntary departure pursuant to
§ 244(e) and orders denying the withholding of deportation under
§ 243(h), are likewise included within the ambit of the exclusive juris-
diction of the Courts of Appeals under § 106(a). 77
Three years later in Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice,78 the Court held that in a deportation hearing the INS had to show
that an alien was deportable with clear, unequivocal, and convincing evi-
dence.79 Courts, in reviewing an INS deportation decision, however,
must only determine whether the deportation order is supported by rea-
sonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record as a whole.80
Since Woodby dealt with the burden of proof on the Attorney General in
a deportation hearing, it is inapplicable in a 243(h) determination, in
which the alien bears the burden of persuasion.8 That burden on the
specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in
the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immedi-
ately proceeding the date of such application, and proves that during all such
period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose
deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme
hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resident; or
(2) is deportable under paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (14),
(15), (16), (17), or (18) of section 1251(a) of this title; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years
immediately following the commission of an act, or the assumption of a status,
constituting a ground for deportation, and proves that during all of such period
he has been and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose
deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
76. 375 U.S. at 227.
77. 375 U.S. at 229. Although the Court's statement about § 243(h) was dictum
it has been followed by all lower courts and the INS. In a later case, Giova v. Rosen-
berg, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), the Court found that section 106(a) includes jurisdiction to
order the reopening of § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970), deportation proceedings.
78. 385 U.S. 276 (1966). For the Court's reasoning, see note 61 supra.
79. 385 U.S. at 285.
80. Id.; Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4)
(1970).
81. Hyppolite v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 382 F.2d 98, 99 (7th Cir.
1967). "Burden of proof" in this Note is used to combine the concepts of burden of
production and burden of persuasion. Both are placed on the alien in 243(h) cases. See
note 50 supra for a consideration of the burden of persuasion problem.
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alien is substantial, but variously articulated.82 Similarly, the standards
for the judicial review of the alien's proof (if the court will admit that it
can undertake such a review) are unclear and conflicting.8"
B. Scope of Judicial Review
The INS and the Board view section 243 (h) as conferring broad
discretionary power upon the Attorney General with very limited judi-
cial review by the courts."' In In re Sihasale,3 the Board maintained
that the
favorable exercise of relief is manifestly not a matter of right under any
circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace. The very
wording of the law provides freedom of decision, to wit: the possibility
of denial on purely discretionary grounds.8 6
Earlier in In re Liao,8 7 the Board said that in reviewing the findings
of a special inquiry officer it would look only to "whether the alien has
had a fair opportunity to present his case, whether the Attorney General
82. See notes 188-99 infra and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. In an early case, Cakmar v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1959), decided before
the adoption of § 106(a) and during the period when the Administrative Procedure Act
was applicable to deportation proceedings, the INS maintained that § 243 (h) determina-
tions were "by law committed to discretion" under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952). The INS did admit that the courts could intervene if (1) the
Attorney General refused to act at all; (2) if his actions were "completely capricious.
(This, we believe, governs the situation of denial of relief simply because a man has
curly hair);" (3) if the Attorney General acted under "fraudulent" circumstances; and
(4) if the Attorney General's acts were ultra vires. 265 F.2d at 61 (emphasis original).
85. 1l.&N. Dec. 531 (1966).
86. Id. at 532. See note 50 supra. The language in the Board's opinion comes
directly from Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), a § 244(a) suspension of deportation
case. The statutory language stated that the Attorney General "may, in his discretion"
suspend deportation. Looking to those words, the Court said:
It does not restrict the considerations which may be relied upon or the proce-
dure by which the discretion should be exercised. Although such aliens have
been given a right to a discretionary determination of an application for sus-
pension . . . a grant thereof is manifestly not a matter of right under any cir-
cumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace.
Id. at 354. There is no evidence the Court intended for this statement to apply to §
243(h) cases. Since § 243(h) cases involve not merely deportation but also potentially
life-endangering persecution, it is arguable that the Attorney General's discretion should
not be absolute, that it should be hedged with standards and judicial review. Of course,
it can be argued that a denial of § 244(a) relief will in certain cases involve similar
consequences.
87. 111.&N. Dec. 113 (1965).
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or his delegate has exercised his discretion and whether there has been
an error of law in the proceeding.""" Since the Attorney General had
"wide latitude' in his disposition of a claim, the Board reasoned that
there was no question whether substantial evidence supported his exer-
cise of discretion.8 9
Until the early 1960's most courts adopted a similarly restricted scope
of review which was confined to issues of procedural due process and
abuse of discretion.90 In the early 1960's some courts began to review
the Service's construction of the statutory language.91 Finally, in the
late 1960's several courts expanded the scope of review to include a
determination whether the Attorney General's action was supported
by substantial evidence on the whole record.92 These developments are
reviewed in the following subsections.
1. Due Process
The courts have not been reluctant to review section 243(h) cases to
ensure the provision of procedural due process to the alien.93 Virtually
all cases decided under the section hold or state in dicta that the alien is
entitled to due process, a hearing, or fair consideration of his 243 (h)
application.94  An important early case, United States ex rel. Dolenz v.
Shaughnessy,95 suggested that the courts' role in 243(h) cases should be
88. Id. at 119.
89. Id.
90. See notes 93-138, 152-80 infra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 129-51 infra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 200-23 infra and accompanying text.
93. Under the predecessor statute of § 243(h), see note 32 supra, the courts required
a hearing on the alien's claim, since the Attorney General was supposed to make a
finding. United States ex rel. Chen Ping Zee v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 607, 610
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). The same court also required that there be some statement or
indication in the alien's file to contradict his statement that he would be subject to
physical persecution. Id. at 611. In Sang Ryup Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. 603, 604
(N.D. Cal. 1952), the court held that when the record showed abundant evidence that an
alien would be subject to physical persecution, the Attorney General had to rebut with
"competent evidence" to the contrary. Contra, United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaugh-
nessy, 107 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd., 200 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 928 (1953).
94. See, e.g., Antolos v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 402 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.
1968); Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968);
Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961);
United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954);
Granado Almerda v. Murff, 159 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
95. 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
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limited to assuring due process. Specifically, the court said that the
alien had a right to present his evidence and have it considered by the
Attorney General."' The court reasoned that the scope of judicial
review had to be restricted since "the very nature of the decision [the
Attorney General] must make concerning what the foreign country is
likely to do is a political issue into which courts should not intrude. '07
This "political issue" rationale for limited judicial review was persua-
sive for nearly a decade after the Dolenz decision. 9
Apart from Dolenz, the decisions reveal little about what constitutes
due process and a fair hearing. In United States ex rel. Paschalidis v.
District Director,99 the court held that an alien was entitled to present
96. Id. at 395.
97. Id. Political, or more precisely foreign policy, considerations are undoubtedly
involved in many § 243(h) cases. These factors, however, are very rarely even
mentioned by the courts or the Board. One exception is In re Liao, 11 I. & N. Dec. 113
(1965), in which a military officer of the Republic of China (Taiwan) entered the
United States to receive military training pursuant to an agreement between the two
countries. Before returning to Taiwan, the respondent resigned his commission and
remained in the United States without INS permission. The special inquiry officer at
the deportation hearing stated that
since the respondent entered the United States as a member of the Armed
Forces of one of our allies, pursuant to a mutual defense effort, solely to re-
ceive training for the purpose of strengthening that ally and the defenses of
the United States he should not be granted relief which would defeat that pur-
pose.
Id. at 115, quoting unpublished opinion of special inquiry officer. The Board found no
error as a matter of law that the special inquiry officer's opinion rested "to some degree"
on foreign policy considerations. Id. at 119-20.
Similar facts were involved in In re Lee, 13 L & N. Dec. 236 (1969), in which the
Board approved a special inquiry officer's denial of adjustment status under § 245, noting
that a grant of adjustment would harm the military training program. Section 243(h)
relief was also denied. In another case involving the attempt of a Formosan military
officer to remain in the United States, Justice Douglas noted the possible dangers
confronting the alien upon deportation.
These petitioners, who have denounced the Chiang Kai-shek regime as a
"police state," will most assuredly either face a firing squad on their return or
receive heavy sentences. Any person critical of the regime is called a "de-
fector." The list of political victims of Taipei's intolerance is too long and
the secret military trials of dissidents too notorious for me to acquiesce in de-
nial of certiorari here.
Cheng Tu Sheng v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 393 U.S. 1054
(1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
98. E.g., Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1960); Sunjka v. Esperdy, 182
F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
99. 143 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The special inquiry officer declined to
recess the hearing until the respondent could present the first-person testimony of a
witness who was an attorney then engaged in a trial.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss1/10
Vol. 1976:59] JUDICIAL REVIEW
the "best available evidence," even though the proceedings might be
slightly delayed until that evidence could be offered.
Due process issues have been raised about letters submitted to the INS
by the United States Department of State or the diplomatic service or
government of the country to which an alien may be deported. 100 Two
cases involved Iranian students who, while in the United States, took
part in political activities or demonstrations against the Shah of Iran. In
both cases the special inquiry officers accepted into the record similar
Department of State letters alleging that the aliens would not suffer
persecution upon their return to Iran. In Kasravi v. United States
Immigration & Naturalization Service,' the letter was not an issue, but
the court devoted a footnote to questioning the competency of such
letters in section 243(h) cases. 10  The respondent alien in Hosseinmar-
di v. Immigration & Naturalization Service' challenged the admission
of the letter into the record and the special inquiry officer's reliance
upon it, since the alien was denied the opportunity to cross-examine its
author and no foundation had been laid regarding the author's expertise
on Iranian affairs. The court sustained the Board's denial of 243(h)
relief and, relying upon an earlier case,10 4 found no error in admitting
the letter."' On petition for rehearing, however, the court, in dictum,
admitted the unreliability of such letters and further conceded that "[lit
100. In an early case, Sang Ryup Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1952),
the court found little evidentiary merit in a letter from the South Korean Ambassador to
the United States stating that no physical persecution was possible in South Korea. The
court noted that
[njo other reply could reasonably be expected. By it the Attorney General did
not receive any more evidence of information . . . than he had before. Such
a statement obviously could be obtained for the asking in every case ...
Id. at 607 (emphasis original).
101. 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
102. Id. at 677 n.l. The court stated:
Such letters from the State Department do not carry the guarantees of reliabil-
ity which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank, but official, dis-
cussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is not always compat-
ible with the high duty to maintain advantageous diplomatic relations with na-
tions throughout the world. The traditional foundation required of expert tes-
timony is lacking; nor can official position be said to supply an acceptable sub-
stitute. No hearing officer or court has the means to know the diplomatic nec-
essities of the moment, in the light of which the statements must be weighed.
103. 405 F.2d 25, 27 (9th Cir. 1968).
104. Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955). See note 113 infra and
accompanying text.
105. 405 F.2d at 27.
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might well have been improper had the Board given substantial weight
to those generalities without corroboration or further inquiry."'100
Recently, in Paul v. United States Immigration & Naturalization
Service,1 7 respondents challenged the entry in the hearing record of
a written statement by the Department of State's Office of Refugees and
Migration. The statement asserted that the respondents had made no
claim of prior persecution in Haiti; hence, they had no "valid claim" for
asylum.' 08 In fact, the aliens had made many claims of prior persecu-
tion.109 The court noted that the State Department's statement was
"nonresponsive" 10 to the respondent's claims but held that entry of
the statement did not render the hearing unfair. The court reasoned
that the immigration judge and Board had based their decisions only
upon the aliens' evidence, since nothing in the record indicated that the
State Department's statement had had any influence."' The language
of the court suggests, however, that the Service and Board would be ill-
advised to rely openly upon similar State Department recommendations,
at least when the alien is unable to test the authors' reliability by cross-
examination or interrogatories." 2
A letter from a South Korean consulor official was at issue in
Namkung v. Boyd," because it was admitted to the record after the
hearing was closed and the respondent was denied a reopening for
rebuttal. The court found no error and reasoned that the Attorney
General could properly consider any information available, including
confidential information that the alien had no opportunity to hear or
106. 405 F.2d at 28.
107. 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
108. Id. at 196 n.3.
109. Id. at 200, 202-04.
110. Id. at 200.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 199-200. Although the Paul and Hosseinmardi decisions foreclose the
Service's and Board's open reliance upon certain State Department recommendations, it
is likely that the realities of interagency communication and cooperation are such that
State Department interests and recommendations will continue to have significant
weight, albeit undisclosed, in INS and Board decisions. Since the INS and Board may
consider information not revealed to the alien, see text accompanying notes 118-23 in fra,
it will be possible to shield formal or informal State Department communications from
later judicial scrutiny even though such communication may have had great significance
in the INS or Board decision.
113. 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955). The alien was a member of the Korean
Communist Party. The letter in question stated that there would be no persecution if
the respondent had "truly repented" and returned to South Korea for "mercy and
guidance." Id. at 387.
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rebut." 4 Not surprisingly, the Board has taken a similar position. In
In re DeLtucia," ' the respondent sought to argue that a letter from an
Italian government official was inadmissable since the alien had no
opportunity to cross-examine the writer. The Board responded that
because section 243(h) relief is discretionary, an alien does not have, as
a matter of right, the privilege of cross-examination. Moreover, accord-
ing to the Board, the Attorney General could consider "any informa-
tion" that would assist the formation of his "opinion."116 More recent
regulations indicate that the Service has adopted a less restrictive posi-
tion. 1
The right of the Attorney General to consider information other than
that adduced at the hearing has been the target of judicial challenge. In
Jay v. Boyd," 8 a section 2441t0 case, the Supreme Court countenanced
the use of confidential information by the INS when disclosure would be
harmful to the United States. Two later cases permitted the Service
to vithhold from the alien only material endangering national security,
at least in the hearing stage.'2 0 Subsequently adopted regulations im-
114. Id. at 388-89.
115. I1 I. & N. Dec. 565, 578, afj'd on other grounds sub nora. De Lucia v. Immi-
gration & Natuialization Serv., 370 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912
(1967).
116. 11 I. & N. Dec. at 578. The language in the Paul and Hosseinmardi decisions
may, however, indicate that De Lucia and Namkung are no longer strong precedent. See
also 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(e) (1976), quoted in note 121 infra.
117, 8 C.F.R. 103.2(2) (1976):
If the decision will be adverse to the applicant or petitioner on the basis of
derogatory evidence considered by the Service and of which the applicant or
petitioner is unaware, he shall be advised thereof and offered an opportunity
to tebut it and present evidence in his behalf before the decision is rendered,
except that classified evidence shall not be made available to him .... In ex-
ercising discretionary power when considering an application or petition, the
district director or officer in charge, in any case in which he is authorized to
make the decision, may consider and base his decision on information not con-
tained in the record and not made available for inspection by the applicant or
petitioner, provided the regional commissioner has determined that such infor-
mation is relevant and classified under Executive Order No. 11652 ... as re-
quiring protection from unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national se-
curity.
118. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
119. See note 75 supra.
120. Milutin v. Bouchard, 370 U.S. 292 (1962); Radic v. Fullilove, 198 F. Supp. 162
(N.D. Cal. 1961). Radic is interesting since the court appeared to believe that the §
243(h) hearing should be understood as an adversary proceeding rather than merely a
chance for the alien to present his claim and evidence--the position of the Dolenz court,
see notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text. The Radic court reasoned that
the right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence in sup-
port of one's position, but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims
Vol. 1976:59]
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plemented those decisions.' 21 Even if the alien has access to the infor-
mation used against him, it may be of little value if his opportunity to
cross-examine or challenge its source is limited.'22 Furthermore, the
alien's chance to rebut with additional evidence may be severely restric-
ted by the Service's regulation about reopening hearings. 12 3
Another ind of due process challenge was raised in Dombrovskis
v. Esperdy124 in which the respondent, a Yugoslavian seaman, argued
that the Service's use of its unpublished decision in In re Kale 21 as
precedent for the handling of the 243(h) claims of all Yugoslavian
seamen denied him individual consideration of his case on the merits.
The court denied the alien's motion for summary judgment 20 and in a
later opinion accepted the INS position that Kale was used in conjunc-
tion with an assessment of the particular evidence in each alien's
claim.127  Thus, there was no denial of due process.
of the opposing party with the privilege of seeking to refute those clahns. The
right to be heard and the right to contest opposing evidence are equal and coex-
isting rights, and both are essential to procedural due process. . .. This right
[to contest opposing evidence] was, in my opinion, inviolate in the absence
of a showing that the disclosure of those documents would be harmful to the
security or well being of the United States ....
198 F. Supp. at 165 (emphasis original). Few courts have been willing to follow
completely the Radic rationale that the § 243(h) hearing is a true adversary proceeding.
121. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(e) (1976):
The trial attorney. . . may submit information not of record to be considered
by the special inquiry officer provided that the special inquiry officer or the
Board has determined that such information is relevant and is classified under
Executive Order No. 11652. . . as requiring protection from unauthorized dis-
closure in the interest of national security. When the special inquiry officer
receives such non-record information he shall inform the respondent thereof
and shall also inform him whether it concerns conditions generally in a speci-
fied country or the respondent himself. Whenever he believes lie can do so
consistently with safeguarding both the information and its source, the special
inquiry officer should state more specifically the general nature of the informa-
tion in order that the respondent may have an opportunity to offer opposing
evidence.
122. See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra.
123. See regulations quoted in notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
124. 195 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also note 269 infra.
125. In re Kale, No. A9 555 532 (INS, April 23, 1958) (unpublished opinion of the
Assistant Commissioner of the Enforcement Division), reprinted in part in Dombrovskis
v. Esperdy, 195 F. Supp. 488, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Because of the number of
§ 243(h) claims by Yugoslav seamen, the Service suspended action on all such claims
while it gathered information on the internal situation in Yugoslavia. That material
was set forth in the Kale decision, which denied relief and which was distributed to all
service officers with an attached letter requiring that all pending Yugoslavian seamen
cases be determined according to the criteria in Kale. 195 F. Supp. at 492.
126. 195 F. Supp. at 496.
127. Dombrovskis v. Esperdy, 209 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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Few other due process issues have been litigated in section 243(h)
cases, and upon analysis due process challenges have produced only
limited restraints upon the Attorney General's procedures or exercise of
discretion. The hearing and other procedural requirements may delay
deportation, but in no way do they ease or clarify the burden of persua-
sion the alien must meet.125
2. Errors of Law and Statutory Construction
In a few cases the courts have been willing to reverse a decision of a
sp--al inquiry officer or the Board on a finding that the statute
has been misconstrued. All of these cases have involved the construc-
tion of the terms "physical persecution" or "persecution." In Blazina v.
Bouchard," the Third Circuit defined "physical persecution" to mean
"confinement, torture, or death inflicted on account of race, religion, or
political viewpoint."' 30 Later that year, the same circuit was confron-
ted in Dunat v. Hurney"'- with the claim of a Yugoslavian seaman that
he would be denied all employment upon his return to his native country.
The INS had held that economic deprivation did not amount to "physical
persecution," but the court reversed, saying
ItJhe denial of an opportunity to earn a livelihood . . . is the
equivalent of a sentence to death by means of starvation and none the
less final because it is gradual. The result of both is the same, and it is
oeo that Congress, motivated by the humanitarian instincts ... certainly
hopctI to avoid when subsection 243(h) was enacted.132
Dunat was the first 243 (h) case to reverse a decision of the Attorney
General for an "error of law" '  or misconstruction of the statute and
was quickly followed by Sovich v. Esperdy. 34 There, the special inquiry
128. See note 50 supra and notes 185-99 in ra and accompanying text.
129. 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
130. Id. at 511.
131. 297 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1961).
132. Id. at 746. Interestingly, the court also suggested in dictum that once given
proof of persecution, the INS "must entertain and exercise its discretion in the manner
prescribed by Congress." Id. at 748. (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 749 (emphasis deleted).
134. 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963). Sovich had escaped from Yugoslavia in 1956.
After a year in an Italian refugee camp, he obtained a job on a Panamanian ship from
which he entered the United States. Deportation proceedings began after he overstayed
the peiiod authorized by his entry permit. In support of his § 243(h) claim, Sovich
testified that while in Yugoslavia he had opposed the Communist government on religious
and political grounds, made statements to friends against the government, been ques-
tioned and warned against further opposition by government officials, and made several
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officer had denied relief by construing the statute to contemplate
persecution visited upon the alleged offender in the form of corporal
punishment, torture or death because of race, religion or political
opinion. Here the punishment which the applicant fears he might
suffer would apparently be after conviction for a crime [defection from
Yugoslavia] cognizable under the recognized juridical system. That is
not persecution.' 3 5
The Sovich court, citing Dunat, found that it had the authority to review
the standards used by the Attorney General in evaluating 243(h) claims
to determine whether he was exercising his discretion within the statuto-
ry limits."3 6 The court said that the special inquiry officer had miscon-
strued the statute or its standards in three respects. First, by assuming
that conviction for an illegal departure under a "recognized juridical
system" was never physical persecution, the special inquiry officer over-
looked the possibility that such a system could be perverted to achieve
persecutory ends, particularly if the imprisonment were for many
years.3 7  Second, it was erroneous to presume that punishment for
attempts to escape (before succeeding). He expressed fear of imprisonment for his
escape, statements, and belief upon any return to Yugoslavia. Id. at 23.
135. Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1963), quoting unpublished opinion
of the special inquiry officer.
136. 319 F.2d at25-27.
Reason as well as authority supports the position that the standards em-
ployed by the Attorney General in exercising his discretion under § 243(h)
are subject to judicial review. The Attorney General's assessment of the con-
ditions obtaining in any particular country, is, of course, a political matter, a
"question of fact." It is equally clear, we believe, that the standards by which
those conditions are to be judged-what Congress meant by the expression
"physical persecution"--is a question of law. For the courts to rule upon that
issue is not an intrusion into the Attorney General's discretion. It is rather
an interpretation of the statutory prerequisites to any proper exercise of his dis-
cretion.
Id. at 26-27.
The court admitted that in some cases the interpretation of a statute might be within
the realm of administrative expertise. No such problem, however, was to be found in §
243(h) which,
like its predecessor statute, reflected the humanitarian intent of Congress that
aliens should not be expelled from our shores into the hands of totalitarian re-
gimes unwilling to recognize even elementary standards of human decency.
Neither the Attorney General nor his delegates in the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service are better able than we to gauge the bounds of that Con-
gressional concern, and thus to define the limits within which the Attorney
General's discretion is to operate.
Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 28-29.
We do not suggest that any incarceration for even political crimes, such as
the one here involved, would constitute physical persecution under § 243(h).
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illegal departure, under the facts presented in Sovich's case, would not
be politically motivated or would not constitute punishment "because of
. . .political opinion." 138  Finally, the special inquiry officer had failed
to include confinement, as required by the Blazina decision, 139 among
the forms of possible persecution. 4  The court therefore remanded the
case so that a renewed application for relief could be considered under
the correct standards.''
In a somewhat self-contradictory dissent 42 Judge Moore argued that
the Attorney General alone had the "competence' to determine the
meaning of "physical persecution."' 4 3  He based this conclusion on the
long history of judicial recognition of the executive and legislative
branches, "plenary" power to exclude and expel aliens14 4 and the execu-
tive's special capacity to evaluate the political conditions in foreign
countries where probable persecution is alleged. Such determinations
"are closely related to the conduct of our foreign relations and involve
political assessments and judgments which the courts have no compe-
tence to review."' 4  While this argument is representative of the judicial
However repugnant to our own concept of justice, a brief confinement for ille-
gal departure or for political opposition to a totalitarian regime would not nec-
essarily fall within the ambit of Congress's special concern in enacting this pro-
vision. We are unwilling to believe, however, that Congress has precluded
from relief under § 243(h) an alien threatened with long years of imprison-
ment, perhaps even life imprisonment, for attempting to escape a cruel dictator-
ship. Such a construction of the statute would attribute to Congress an insens-
itivity to human suffering wholly inconsistent with our national history.
We hold, therefore, that the Attorney General, through his delegate, errone-
ously construed the limits of his discretion in ruling that imprisonment for ille-
gal departure may never constitute "physical persecution" within the purview
of § 243(h).
Id. at 29 (emphasis original).
138. Id. at 28
139. Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
See text accompanying note 130 supra.
140. 319 F.2d at28.
141. ld. at 29.
142. At one point Judge Moore said that as a first step the Attorney General must
make "factual findings as to whether the statutory prerequisites of eligibility have been
met." Id. at 32. Then he remarked, "the determination of whether an alien would be
subject to physical persecution is not simply a decision of a factual question. It is the
opinion of the Attorney General that is to control." Id. at 33.
143. Id. at 34.
144. Id. at 32, citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), Carlson v.
Landon. 342 U.S. 524 (1952), Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), Fok Young Yo
v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902), and Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651 (1892).
145. 319 F.2d at 34.
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attitude prevailing until the early 1960's, it is more applicable to
judicial review of INS factual determinations than to the review of the
standards used by the service or its construction of the statute.
After the 1965 amendment of section 243(h),14" the Ninth Circuit in
Kovac v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service1 47 re-
viewed the Board's construction of "persecution on account of race,
religion or political opinion." In evaluating Kovac's claim of possible
economic persecution, the Board had applied the Dunat 48 standard
under which relief could be granted only if the alien proved he would be
denied all means of earning a living. The court looked to the language
and the legislative history149 of the 1965 amendment and found the
Board's standard to be erroneous. According to the court, Congress
intended to
effect a significant, broadening change in section 243(h) which would
lighten the burden imposed on applicants for asylum by removing the
requirement that they show threatened bodily harm. This intent seems
especially relevant to cases of alleged economic persecution. The
burden of showing a probable denial of all means of earning a
livelihood arose from the necessity of showing bodily harm. It was a
particularly difficult burden for an alien to discharge, and resulted in
the denial of relief in cases of economic persecution, though the
harassment was substantial.
The amendment thus eliminated the premise upon which courts
construing the old statute-and the Board in this case-based the rule
that, to come within the reach of section 243(h), a denial of employ-
ment opportunities must extend to all means of gaining a livelihood.
The amended statute shifts the emphasis from the consequences of
the oppressive conduct to the motivation behind it. An alien is now
eligible for the humanitarian relief provided by the statute if he can
show that, if deported, he would probably suffer persecution because of
race, religion, or political opinion.'5 °
146. See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text.
147. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969). Kovac, a Yugoslavian of Hungarian extraction,
had been trained as a chef. Because he refused to spy for the Yugoslavian secret police
upon Hungarians in Yugoslavia he lost his job as a chef and was unable to find
employment as a cook. He eventually obtained a position on a Yugoslavian ship and
deserted in the United States. He alleged that he would be imprisoned upon return to
Yugoslavia because his desertion would be considered a denunciation of communism;
furthermore, he would be unable to find suitable employment. Id. at 104.
148. See notes 131-32 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text.
150. 407 F.2d at 106-07.
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Consequently, under amended section 243(h) a "probability of de-
liberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage upon a alien
for reasons of race, religion or political opinion is sufficient to confer
upon the Attorney General the discretion to withhold deportation."''
Kovac is, however, the only decision since 1965 in which a court has
reversed the Attorney General on grounds of misconstruction. There
appears to have been no other litigation on the issue whether the 1965
amendments worked a significant liberalization of the standards of
persecution incorporated under the section.
3. Abuse of Discretion; Arbitrary and Capricious Action
In addition to reviewing for adequate due process and proper agency
construction of the statutory language, the courts may also review for
abuse of discretion and arbitrary or capricious action by the Attorney
General. 52 With the exception of the cases discussed below, no court
has found either abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious action in
the denial of section 243 (h) relief. Indeed, one must look elsewhere
to find any discussion or definition of the terms.' 53
151. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
152. See, e.g., Shkukani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 435 F.2d 1378, 1382
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Kerkai v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 418 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1067 (1970); Siu Fung Luk v.
Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 801 (1969); Hosseinmardi v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1968); Asghari v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968); Hyppolite v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967); Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967); Morin v. Bouchard, 311 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1962);
United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955).
The courts do not appear to draw any distinctions between abuse of discretion and
arbitrary or capricious action.
153. Professor Jaffe has suggested that,
[biroadly stated an abuse of discretion is an exercise of discretion in which
a relevant consideration has been given an exaggerated, an "unreasonable"
weight at the expense of others. The "letter" has been observed; the "spirit"
has been violated. Discretion implies a "balancing"; where the result is eccen-
tric, either there has not been a balancing, or a hidden or mayhap improper
motive has been at work. ... Judge Magruder has put it well as "a clear
error of judgment in the conclusion . . . reached upon a weighing of the rele-
vant factors."
L JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMiNSTRATIVE ACTION 586-87 (1965) (emphasis
supplied by Prof. Jaffe), citing McBee v. Bomar, 296 F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 1961).
McBee, however, involved the abuse of discretion by a court in not granting a motion for
a continuance.
Professor Berger has said that
[i]t is no more possible to encompass the scope of "arbitrariness" within a
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The cases involving the suspension of deportation have indicated
some of the content of the abuse of discretion standard of review. In
United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy,c4 the court said that it
could not review the Service's discretionary decision to deny an alien a
voluntary departure unless "it affirmatively appears that the denial has
been actuated by considerations Congress could not have intended to
single definition than to define satisfactorily "reasonable care" or "due process"
or "fraud." Basically arbitrariness consists of action that is unreasonable
under all the circumstances. A few criteria, which by no means exhaust the
possibilities, can be drawn from the cases. Arbitrary action may be colored
by improper motivation; it may be action which has an impermissible basis,
as when Republicans or redheads are denied an equal opportunity to do busi-
ness with the government; or action which is unsupported by evidence, or turns
on failure to consider relevant evidence, even in the presence of plenary discre-
tion.
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. Rnv. 55, 82-83
(1965) (footnotes omitted). Of particular interest is Professor Berger's statement that
action unsupported by evidence is an abuse of discretion. The cases cited by Professor
Berger suggest that a finding or conviction unsupported by any evidence constitutes a
violation of due process. Id., cases cited at 59 n.20, 71 n.84. It is unclear whether
"unsupported by evidence" also includes inappropriate (i.e., not supportive of the
finding) or insufficient evidence. The latter possibility, of course, merges with the
substantial evidence standard, a different scope of review. See notes 228-30 infra and
accompanying text.
Drawing upon the work of Professors Jaffe and Berger, one student commentator has
made the following observations about the concept of abuse of discretion:
"Abuse of discretion . . .". . . mean[s] more than that the agency, after con-
sidering and weighing all the relevant facts, struck a balance different from
that which the court would have reached. . . [Aidministrative agencies are
vested with discretion by Congress primarily because of their expected exper-
tise in divining and effectuating congressional policy. The agency's expertise
is probably only of value so long as it weighs those considerations, and only
those considerations, which Congress intended that it take into account in ef-
fectuating the legislative policy. Thus, if an agency were to include within its
consideration irrelevant factors, or if it were to exclude a factor which Con-
gress intended it to consider in enforcing federal policy, it would have "abused"
its discretion, because: 1) the agency would no longer be acting under the con-
gressional mandate; and 2) its value as an expert body-the reason for defer-
ence by the courts and for congressional trust-would be lost.
A third way in which an agency might abuse its discretion would be to give
unreasonable weight to one or more relevant factors. Congress presumably did
not, and possibly could not, delegate authority to an agency to act arbitrarily
or capriciously. Thus, if an agency reached a completely unreasonable result
after weighing the relevant facts, the court should set that finding aside.
Comment, Abuse of Discretion: Administrative Expertise vs. Judicial Surveillance, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 40, 41-42 (1966) (footnotes omitted). The problem with applying this
analysis to a § 243(h) case, of course, is the absence in the statutory language or
legislative history of any clear indication of the "relevant factors." See also Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82
H.ARv. L. REv. 367, 368 (1968); note 169 infra.
154. 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, C.J).
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make relevant."'I5 While the Kaloudis court did not specifically tie its
test to the abuse of discretion concept, that connection was subsequently
made by the same circuit in Wong Wing Hang v. United States Immi-
gration & Naturalization Service.1
Wong Wing Hang involved an alien's appeal from the Service's denial
of a section 244(a)157 suspension of deportation. That section, although
not specifically requiring any findings of fact by the Attorney General
before the grant of a suspension, does set forth factual criteria (period
of residency, good moral character, hardship) that the alien must
satisfy before relief may be obtained. In Wong Wing Hang, Judge
Friendly outlined a two-step review process of section 244(a) cases.
First, the Service's findings of fact "on which a discretionary denial of
suspension is predicated must pass the substantial evidence test.' ' 8
Second, presuming the alien's evidence satisfied the statutory criteria for
suspension, the court would review the Attorney General's exercise of
discretion in denying relief; a denial could be reversed if it constituted an
abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious action.15 Judge Friendly
155. Id. at 491.
156. 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966).
157. See text quoted in note 75 supra.
158. 360 F.2d at 717. Judge Friendly drew this conclusion from a footnote in Foti:
In the instant case the special inquiry officer not only found that petitioner
failed to meet the eligibility requirements for suspension of deportation, since
no hardship would result from his deportation, but further indicated that, even
had the hardship requirement been met, relief would have been denied as a dis-
cretionary matter. Since a special inquiry officer cannot exercise his discretion
to suspend deportation until he finds the alien statutorily eligible for suspen-
sion, a finding of eligibility and an exercise of (or refusal to exercise) discre-
tion may properly be considered as distinct and separate matters. And since
the finding of eligibility involves questions of fact and law, paragraph (4) of
§ 106(a) might be read to require this finding to be based on substantial evi-
dence in the record. . . . However, we need not pass on this question here.
And, of course, denial of suspension of deportation as a discretionary matter
is reviewable only for arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, and thus could
hardly be within the procedural and evidentiary requisites of paragraph (4).
Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217, 228-29 n.15 (1963).
159. 360 F.2d at 718. Judge Friendly's reasoning is interesting. He begins by noting
that § 106(a) does not provide a standard of review for the exercise of agency discretion.
Section 106(a), however, was intended by Congress to "'implement and apply"' § 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970), to deportation cases.
The APA's "abuse of discretion" scope of review provision would apply provided the
Service's action is not one "committed to agency discretion by law." Although Congress
had amended § 244(a) by substituting a requirement that the Attorney General form an
"opinion" rather than make a "finding" on the issue of hardship, both the Service and the
courts had countenanced judicial review of the discretionary determination. Hence,
review was not precluded. 360 F.2d at 717-719.
Judge Friendly's assertion that § 106(a) was designed to "'implement and apply'" the
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then went on to explore the meaning of the term "abuse of discretion."
He noted that there were two arguable meanings, the first being "a sort of
'clearly erroneous' concept" best used in reviewing discretionary judicial
action.' According to the second concept, discretion is abused "only
when the action 'is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another
way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man
would take the view' under discussion."'' 1 Judge Friendly found the
latter concept more appropriate for reviewing administrative action and
developed it by adding:
[t]he denial of suspension to an eligible alien would be an abuse of
discretion if it were made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis
such as an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group,
or, in Judge Learned Hand's words, on other "considerations that
Congress could not have intended to make relevant."' 62
Wong Wing Hang thus distinguished judicial review of the Attorney
General's findings of fact that may establish eligibility for discretionary
relief from judicial review for abuse of the actual exercise of discretion.
Even in some section 244 cases the distinction may be hard to main-
tain;6 3 in section 243(h) cases it is often difficult to tell how, if at
all, the courts could readily distinguish between the two levels of review
of fact and discretionary action. Unlike section 244, section 243(h)
contains few factual prerequisites for a suspension; thus, there is less
material for a court to call, by analogy, a finding and review with the
substantial evidence test. Evidence of possible persecution in a foreign
nation is often much less objective than evidence of residence, good
Administrative Procedure Act to deportation cases appears to contradict the Supreme
Court's analysis in Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217, 224-26. See
note 69 supra.
160. 360 F.2d at 718.
161. Id., citing Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
162. 360 F.2d at 719, citing United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d
489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950). The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed its two step analysis
and definition of abuse of discretion in a case involving the denial of a voluntary
departure. Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.).
163. See Rassano v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 492 F.2d
220, 227 (7th Cir. 1974). The court held that the Attorney General had abused his
discretion in finding that the respondent had failed to establish his good moral character.
The court's discussion indicated that the abuse was in the finding of facts, not the
exercise of discretion. Since the finding of some facts is a prerequisite to the exercise of
discretion and any abuse, the two-step Wong Wing Hang review process will in some, but
not all cases, seem artificial.
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moral character, and hardship in the United States. Moreover, Con-
gress consciously wrote any requirement of a factual finding by the
Attorney General out of section 243 (h).164 Perhaps for these reasons,
courts, until recently, 6 5 did not employ the Wong Wing Hang analysis
in 243(h) cases. As a consequence, however, courts that claimed to be
reviewing for abuse of discretion were very imprecise in explaining the
contents or process of their analysis. Most of the courts appear to have
reviewed the evidence closely and then found no abuse. 66 Other
courts stated that they could not substitute their opinion on the facts for
that of the Attorney General, but then went on to look at the facts in the
record to see if the denial of relief was supported by a "reasonable
foundation," "ample evidence," or some other similar evidentiary stan-
dard '1 7 and hence was not an abuse of discretion.' 6  That is, review for
abuse of discretion seems to have involved some degree of review of the
facts.1
69
164. See text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 200-23 infra.
166. See, e.g., cases cited note 151 supra.
167. See notes 181-84 infra and accompanying text.
168. E.g., Khalil v. District Director of the United States Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 457 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1972); Antolos v. United States Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 402 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1968); Polites v. Sahli, 302 F.2d 449 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 916 (1962), Kan Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961); United States ex rel. Contisani v. Holton, 248
F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932 (1958).
169. The question of the extent to which judicial review of administrative action for
abuse of discretion constitutes a review of the evidence remains ambiguous. In Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the Supreme Court
considered the meaning of judicial review of agency action for abuse of discretion under
§ 10(e)(G)(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). To
find that an action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,"
the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment ...
Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency.
401 U.S. at 416 (emphasis added). The "relevant factors" language comes from McBee
v. Bomar, 296 F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 1961). The Court's language can be construed to
mean that the reviewing court should look to the facts in the record to determine
whether the agency considered the relevant factors (economic and environmental in
Overton Park) in taking its action. Failure to consider such factors would be an abuse
of discretion. It should be noted, however, that judicial scrutiny of agency consideration
of relevant factors sweeps more broadly than Judge Friendly's definition in Wong Wing
Hang of the scope of review for abuse of discretion. See text accompanying notes 160-
62 supra.
Under the Overton Park analysis the key problem for the courts becomes whether
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Three section 243(h) cases have found abuse of discretion or arbi-
trary or capricious action. United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy"'0
involved a convoluted set of facts and procedure. The court found
the special inquiry officer's refusal to reopen respondent's hearing to
evaluate her 243(h) application to be arbitrary and capricious since
there had been no substantive determination of the application, some-
thing the court believed necessary because the claimed potential physical
persecution could involve "the very life" of the respondent. 1  In
addition, the court found the evidence offered in the respondent's appli-
cation to be "compelling enough to lend at least prima facie credence to
[her] assertions and to compel an administrative decision on their
(and arguably how) the agency considered the relevant factors, particularly when no
factual findings are required and the administrative record is incomplete. In Overton
Park, the Court remanded the case for review on the whole record which, if it was
incomplete, could be supplemented by requiring testimony from the agency officials who
made the decision. In § 243(h) cases, remand and testimony by INS officers would be
unlikely, for the Service requires a full record with opinions in virtually all deportation
matters. And, in fact, the reported Board decisions in § 243(h) cases show that the
alien's evidence is usually weighed and rebutted. The Board normally indicates the fac-
tors used in reaching its decision.
For a consideration of the scope of review issue in Overton Park, see The Supreme
Court-1970 Term, 85 HIv. L. REv. 3, 315-25 (1971). The Court reaffirmed the
Overton Park exposition of review for abuse of discretion in Bowman Transp., Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). Although Overton
Park and Bowman involved the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), which are not applicable to the review of § 243(h)
cases, there is no reason to believe that the Court would impose a different definition of
review for abuse of discretion in deportation cases.
170. 234 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The respondent was a Haitian who had
been ordered deported after withdrawing a § 243 (h) application. She was permitted a
voluntary departure but failed to leave as scheduled. She was therefore placed upon a
flight to Haiti, but because of bad weather the plane was diverted to Miami and the flight
terminated. There respondent was mistakenly admitted as a nonimmigrant for pleasure;
she remained in the United States until she was again apprehended by the INS and
ordered to show cause why she should not be deported. Before the hearing, the
respondent filed a § 243(h) application including an affadavit outlining the antiDuvalier
activities of her family and their search for asylum in foreign embassies and the United
States. No hearing was held, and six months later the order to show cause was
cancelled on the grounds that the original deportation order was still outstanding because
no deportation had been accomplished and therefore no new entry to the United States
was effected. Ms. Mercer then sought a reopening of her original deportation hearing so
she could present her § 243(h) claim. The motion was denied by the special inquiry
officer because the evidence sought to be presented supposedly had been available at the
time of the original hearing, and no new circumstances had arisen warranting a
reopening. The respondent, after having her appeal dismissed by the Board, sought a
writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 612-14.
171. Id. at 615.
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validity."' 72 The court also held the special inquiry officer's decision to
be an abuse of discretion because he had failed to take administrative
notice of the repressive conditions in Haiti, facts widely reported in
the press.17:
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy,174 Judge
Frank took judicial notice of the "ruthless behavior" of the government
of the People's Republic of China toward supporters of the former
Nationalist government and found the INS decision that the respondent
would not be physically persecuted to be arbitrary and capriciousY.15
Although the reasoning of the court was clearly correct, the result-
given the facts-was arguably incorrect, because the respondent, a long-
time supporter of the Nationalist government, had refused to execute the
documents required to permit his deportation to Taiwan and had,
instead, raised his section 243(h) claim in terms of deportation to the
mainland.17 This was clearly a delaying tactic of the sort courts should
not tolerate. 77
Finally, in Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,1 7 1 the
Ninth Circuit found that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious because it was founded upon a "patent misconstruction of the rec-
ord" rather than a weighing of the evidence. 1" 9 Although the court did
172. Id. The court was particularly concerned with the evidence regarding the
respondent's brother who had been active in antiDuvalier politics in Haiti and, after
fleeing the country, had been involved in various antiDuvalier refugee organizations.
173. Id. at 616-17.
174. 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J.).
175. Id. at 718-19. Judge Frank stated:
On the basis of a fact which we know judicially, an administrative determina-
tion of the contrary fact is arbitrary and capricious, and therefore administra-
tive action grounded on that finding is outside the administrative discretion
conferred by the statute.
Id. at 719.
Fong Foo is also cited for its dictum:
[a] statute should, if possible be so construed as not to be-or come close to
the brink of being-unconstitutional. This statute [§ 243(h)] comes close to
that brink and perhaps goes over it, if interpreted to give the Attorney General,
or any of his subordinates, arbitrary power.
Id. at 720.
176. Id. at 717.
177. See note 4 supra.
178. See notes 147-51 supra and accompanying text.
179. 407 F.2d at 107. Kovac had testified that he had ceased working on shore and
had taken a job on a ship in order to obtain a home for his family. The Board said that
this testimony "completely belied" his claim of persecution. The court, on the other
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not elaborate upon the point, it would seem that the Board should ex-
plain in its opinion how it evaluates the evidence and construes the
record to avoid reversal for taking arbitrary and capricious action. Such
a requirement is basically one of due process, that is, the necessity for
a "reasoned decision."' 80
Whatever the meaning of abuse of discretion in section 243(h) cases,
it is evident that very few aliens can satisfy its requirements and obtain
reversal of an INS denial of a stay of deportation.
4. Review of Evidence
The courts appear to review the evidence in 243(h) cases in three
distinguishable ways. First, many courts that claim to be reviewing for
abuse of discretion look to the facts in the record and set them out at
some length in their opinions. 8' In the context of reviewing for abuse of
discretion, the Seventh Circuit has said, in at least four cases, that it
will not substitute its opinion for the Attorney General's if his "rea-
sons" for denying relief are "sufficient on their face."'82  "Reasons"
hand, read the testimony to mean that Kovac had taken the seamen's job because
persecution made it impossible to find work on shore and support his family. Id.
180. See Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Ser,., 360 F.2d 715 (2d
Cir. 1966).
181. See cases cited note 152 supra. See also note 169 supra.
182. Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 379 F.2d 536, 637 (7th Cir. 1967);
Chao-Ling Wang v. Pilliod, 285 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1960); Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282
F.2d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 1960); Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207, 210 (7th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961).
Lena, a Turkish citizen of the Greek Orthodox religion, claimed he would be
persecuted in Turkey for his religious beliefs. His testimony and other evidence
revealed, however, that the Greek Orthodox releigion was practiced by other individuals
in Turkey and that he had not been prevented from attending church or working. Nor
had he been arrested while living in Turkey. 379 F.2d at 537-38. In Chao-Ling Wang,
a Nationalist Chinese naval officer in the United States for military training overstayed
his visa and claimed he would be physically persecuted upon return to Taiwan. The
special inquiry officer apparently discussed the nature of the Nationalist government and
determined it was "not a police state." The court did not disagree and added that a
military prosecution for desertion was not comprehended within § 243 (h). 285 F.2d at
518, 520. Obrenovic involved a Yugoslavian citizen who offered as grounds for possible
physical persecution his service in the Chetniks during World War II, his postwar arrest,
a letter from his wife in Yugoslavia, and the facts that he had secured his passport
surreptitiously and had written an antigovernment article. The INS officer described
conditions in that country and found the respondent's evidence not "convincing." The
court agreed. 282 F.2d at 875. In Kam Ng, the alien claimed he would be returned to
the People's Republic of China if he were deported to Hong Kong. Neither the INS
officer or the court could find any reason to believe the contention. 279 F.2d at 209.
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as used in the opinions appear to be equivalent to findings of fact.18 3
The Ninth Circuit requires that the decision of the Service or Board be
based upon a "reasonable foundation.' 8 4  Neither circuit has articulated
the content of its standard; thus, the facts of the cases are the only clues
to the meanings of the standards as applied.
A second form of review of the evidence appears to occur when the
courts determine that the alien has not met his burden of proof of
persecution. (When the courts discuss "burden of proof" they usually
mean both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production).
This review occurs, in some cases, in conjunction with a review for
abuse of discretion. Given the circumstances of most aliens in this
country fighting deportation, the burden of proof is onerous, if not
impossible, in practice. The Board acknowledged some of the problems
facing a typical respondent who
has the obligation to set forth the conditions relating to her personally
which support her anticipation of persecution. Characteristically, she
183. See, e.g., Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 379 F.2d 536, 537-38
(7th Cir. 1967).
184. Khalil v. District Director of the United States Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 457 F.2d 1276, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972); Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740 (9th
Cir. 1962).
Khalil involved a citizen of the United Arab Republic who came to the United States
as a personal servant of another Egyptian. She and her employer claimed she would be
persecuted for her anti-communist beliefs. The court noted that the respondent and her
witnesses presented no factual support for her claim, "hence the INS was not clearly
wrong in discounting the conclusory statements of danger and determining that Khalil
had failed to sustain her burden of proof." 457 F.2d at 1278. The court here appears to
have equated "reasonable foundation" with the administrative determination to disregard
particular elements of the respondent's evidence and the alien's failure generally to meet
her burden of persuasion. Analytically, a reasonable foundation should require more
than the failure of the alien's proof for the concept suggests some sort of affirmative
burden on the Service. In practice, however, the distinction is not fully recognized.
Certainly in cases in which the claim is patently without merit and advanced only as a
delaying tactic, it would be inappropriate to burden the Service with pointless rebuttal.
More problematic are the cases in which the alien raises a claim with at least some-
foundation in fact or based upon comprehensible fear.
Chi Sheng Liu involved an alien who first departed for the People's Republic of China
where his family lived; when the plane landed in Hawaii, he disembarked and claimed
possible persecution. The INS then designated Taiwan as the country to which he
would be deported. The alien proceeded to raise a § 243(h) claim on the grounds
that the Nationalist government was ruthless and would persecute him for earlier seeking
to go to the mainland. The court said it was unaware of the "uncivilized" character of
the Nationalist government which would understand his reasons for wanting originally
to go to the People's Republic. 297 F.2d at 742. The court did not discuss the content
or nature of the "reasonable foundation" for the INS decision, but as in Khalil it appears
to be the failure of the alien to meet his burden of persuasion.
Washington University Open Scholarship
98 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:59
has available to her no better methods of ascertaining current political
conditions abroad than does the average person. Hence, practically
speaking, although she may ultimately have the burden of persuasion,
her own testimony may be the best-in fact the only-evidence
available.18 5
As indicated by the Kovac' 86 court, before the 1965 amendments of
the section, the "physical persecution" standard required very substan-
tial proof by the alien. Most courts of that period did not articulate the
extent of the burden of persuasion. Instead, they looked to the evidence
on the record and said it was insufficient to indicate the probability of
physical persecution.' 87
Since 1965, a few courts have developed certain verbal formulations
to describe the alien's burden of persuasion. Thus, in Lena v. Immigra.
tion & Naturalization Service"" the court stated that the Attorney Gen-
eral restricted the favorable exercise of his discretion to cases of a "clear
probability of persecution of the particular individual." Other courts
have been less precise. The Kovac court reasoned that the 1965
amendments lightened the burden on the alien but never indicated
extent of the reduction.18 9  In Kerkai v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
185. In re Sihasale, 11 I. & N. Dec. 531, 532-33, (1966).
One commentator has aptly described the quandary of the alien:
'Because of his flight, a refugee may have no documentation or witnesses to
relate the facts of his particular case. As a result, he may be unable to intro-
duce evidence which sufficiently supports his position. In such a situation, the
real issue becomes the claimant's credibility.
Note, Immigration Law and the Refugee-A Recommendation to Harmonize the Statutes
with the Treaties, 6 CAL F. W. IN'fL LJ. 129, 145 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
For a discussion of the burden of proof problem in § 243(h) cases, see generally
Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws: Further Develop-
ments, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 574 80 (1972).
186. See notes 147-51 supra and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962); Seric v. Flagg, 303
F.2d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 1962).
188. 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added). Although the court was
discussing the circumstances under which the Attorney General would exercise his dis-
cretion the respondent presumably would have to provide evidence of the clear proba-
bility of his persecution to gain relief from deportation.
The same standard was applied in Hyppolite v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
382 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1967). The respondent alleged that she would be persecuted
in Haiti, where her father had disappeared and from which her remaining family had
fled. The special inquiry officer denied relief largely on the ground that the respondent
had, of her own volition, previously returned to Haiti for a two month visit without
incident.
189. 407 F.2d at 106-07; see text accompanying note 150 supra.
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tion Service,' the court spoke of the requirement on the alien to
"substantiate" his claim, while the court in Hamad v. United States Im-
migration & Naturalization Service' spoke vaguely of the respondent's
"burden of proof to establish the probability" that he would be perse-
cuted.
The same or a more rigorous burden of persuasion is imposed upon
respondents who seek to reopen a hearing to present evidence on a
243(h) claim. Courts have required the alien to show "any likelihood
of success" 1 2 on his claim, "some evidence"' 3 of possible persecu-
tion, or a "probability,"'' "clear probability,"' 95  or "prima facie
190. 418 F.2d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 1969). The respondent, formerly a member of the
Hungarian Communist part,", said she believed she would be arrested for leaving that
country and would have difficulty finding employment. The Board found the
possible arrest would not be grounds for granting relief and that the alien would not be
excluded from all employment. The court said that since the respondent had not
substantiated her claims, denial of the claim was neither an abuse of discretion nor arbi-
trary and capricious. Id. at 218-19.
191. 420 F.2d 645, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Hamad was a Jordanian citizen who
claimed he would be persecuted in Jordan because he was opposed to the government.
Moreover, while he was in the United States he had criticized King Hussein in the
presence of a visiting Jordanian military officer. The Board had rejected the § 243(h)
application because there was no evidence that the alien bad had prior trouble with
Jordanian authorities or that "any Jordanian authority had taken steps to insure that
[he] would be punished if he should return to Jordan." The court agreed, saying that
Hamad had not shown any "probability" of persecution. Id.
192. Lam Leung Kam v. Esperdy, 274 F. Supp. 485, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The
court said that "mere conclusory statements" about dangerous conditions in Hong Kong
were inadequate. Id.
193. Cheung Kai Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968). The respondents argued that they
would be subject to persecution in Hong Kong because it was possible that the People's
Republic of China would take over the British colony in the future. The court found
this argument "too speculative" to constitute "some evidence" of persecution. Id.
194. Shkukani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Sth Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 US. 920 (1971). Shkukani's home and family were in a Jordanian city
occupied by the Israelis in 1967. He alleged that should he be returned to Jordan
proper he would be subject to persecution because of the location of his home and
because neither he nor his family supported Palestinian guerilla activities on the occupied
West Bank. Neither the Board nor the court believed this allegation to be sufficient
evidence of any probability of persecution. Id. at 1379-80.
Shkukani also is significant because it reads the Kovac case, see notes 147-51 supra and
accompanying text, as exploring the meaning of "persecution" and not changing the
"quantum of proof necessary to show persecution." 435 F.2d at 1380.
195. Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971).
The respondent was a former police sergeant during Trujillo's regime in the Dominican
Republic who claimed he would be killed by a vengeful mob as soon as he arrived in that
country. The court sustained the Board's finding because Rosa failed to prove the "clear
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case"'190 of persecution.
Despite these various standards applied by the courts in defining the
alien's burden of persuasion it is clear they have little practical differ-
ence-at least none that can be seen, for since 1965 the Board and INS
have been reversed only once.1 7  In the reported cases no alien has met
the required burden of persuasion. This fact lends weight to the
Shkukani court's argument that the 1965 amendments expanded the
kinds of persecution that could be shown, but did not reduce the
quantum of proof (that is, the burden of persuasion) required.0 8 Most
section 243(h) cases are, therefore, of the greatest interest insofar as
they reveal what fact patterns the Board and courts will accept in
approving a denial of relief. 99
probability" of persecution. Instead, he had offered only his assertions and an affidavit
from the Dominican Consul General in the United States containing hearsay and
unsubstantiated conclusions.
196. MacCaud v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 500 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir.
1974). MacCaud, an escaped Canadian prisoner, claimed he would be beaten by
Canadian prison guards for his escape and support of a Quebec liberation group. The
court said that this allegation did not constitute a prima facie case of persecution
sufficient to require it to approve a motion to reopen, in part because
[t]he possibility the alien will encounter physical abuse by prison guards on
his return is not a basis for statutory relief since the Canadian government
does not countenance such activity and since appellant must be regarded as
having adequate safeguards under Canadian law.
Id. at 359.
197. Kovac v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 102 (9th
Cir. 1969); see notes 147-51 supra.
198. Shkukani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); see note 194 supra.
199. See notes 231-63 infra and accompanying text.
As stated earlier, see note 81 supra and accompanying text, the Woodby requirement
that deportability be shown by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence does not apply
to the INS in § 243(h) cases. Hyppolite v. Immigration & Naturalization Sew., 382
F.2d 98, 99 (7th Cir. 1967). Nor must the Attorney General support his decision
denying relief with substantial evidence the alien will not be persecuted. Chao-Ling
Wang v. Pilliod, 285 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1960). Moreover, no court has held that
the INS is under an obligation to rebut the alien's proof before denying relief; in fact,
courts have specifically rejected that contention of burden-shifting. See, e.g., Shkukani v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 435 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
920 (1971).
Although the courts may be correct in refusing to accept the burden-shifting thesis, it
can readily be argued on humanitarian grounds that nce the alien has presented some
evidence or an understandable fear of persecution the INS, in fairness, should present
some countervailing material or arguments. See also notes 220-23 infra and accompany-
ing text. And, in reality, this is what appears to have occurred in many Board cases in
which a large portion of the opinion is often devoted to rebutting the alien's testimony
and evidence. See note 211 infra. At times, however, the Board's arguments seem to be
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A third, and substantially different, form of review of the facts clearly
emerged in Hamad v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv-
ice .20  The court said its review of Board decisions was a two-step
process. First, it would review the factual findings upon which the
denial of relief was based by applying the substantial evidence on the
whole record test. Second, the Board's exercise of discretion in denying
a stay of deportation would be reviewed for any abuses of discretion.2°'
grounded more on speculation than on facts in the record. See note 252 infra and
accompanying text. This should not be the practice when the denial of relief may have
grave consequences for the alien.
200. 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see note 191 supra (facts of the case).
201. Id. at 646-47. The origins of this analysis are curious. It was first applied in
Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir.
1966), see notes 156-62 supra, a § 244(a) case. Then, in United States ex rel. Kordic v.
Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967), the respondent, seeking to avoid deportation to
Yugoslavia. attempted to have the court apply a Wong Wing Hang analysis to a § 243
(h) case. The court did so indirectly by arguing that it could not say that the district
court judge had applied the wrong test, even though his opinion was couched largely in
terms of abuse of discretion and did not clearly reveal the two-step process. Id. at 239.
On this precedent the Hamad court based its holding. 420 F.2d at 646.
The Kordic formulation of the test is, however, somewhat more useful than that in
Hamad. The first step is a "factual inquiry as to the probability . . . [of] persecution,"
with the facts measured against the substantial evidence test. The second step is to
measure the "exercise of [the District Director's or special inquiry officer's] discretion on
the facts he ha[s] found" against the abuse of discretion standard. 386 F.2d at 239
(emphasis added).
The meaning and application of judicial review of substantial evidence on the whole
record have been considered by many courts and commentators. Nonetheless, the
standard remains imprecise. In one early case the Supreme Court stated, "[s]ubstantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). A year later the Court added that substantial
evidence "must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a
verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury."
NLRB v. Columbian Enamelling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
The substantial evidence standard also reflects a degree of congressional and judicial
deference to agency experience and expertise. The standard
frees the reviewing courts of the time-consuming and difficult task of weighing
the evidence, it gives proper respect to the expertise of the administrative tri-
bunal and it helps promote the uniform application of the statute. These poli-
cies are particularly important when a court is asked to review an agency's
fashioning of discretionary relief. In this area agency determinations fre-
quently rest upon a complex and hard-to-review mix of considerations. By giv-
ing the agency discretionary power to fashion remedies, Congress places a pre-
mium upon agency expertise, and, for the sake of uniformity, it is usually better
to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion
for that of the agency.
Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620-21 (1965) (footnotes omit-
ted).
Thus the substantial evidence test does not mean that the court must set aside an
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The court did not clearly show how Hamad's evidence and the Board's
reasoning were to be measured against the substantial evidence stan-
dard; rather, it merely said that Hamad had failed to meet his burden of
showing the "probability" of persecution." 2 Consequently, there was
no need to reach the second stage of review, for "the Board had no
occasion to exercise its discretion to withhold deportation of the petition-
er . . "203
Paralleling the Hamad °4 decision, one court appears to have used a
agency determination if there exists substantial evidence for an opposite conclusion.
"Mhe possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence."
Id. at 620.
It is commonly stated, as in Consolo, that the reviewing court must not weigh the evi-
dence, including the inferences drawn from the facts. See id. at 620; 4 K. DAvis,
ADmINISmATIVE LAw TREATISE § 29.05, at 138 (1958); Jaffe, Judicial Review of Ques-
tions of Fact, 69 IH.v. L. Rnv. 1020, 1028 (1958). Nonetheless, the court must review
the whole administrative record: "[tihe substantiality of evidence must take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). In Universal Camera, Justice Frankfurter attempt-
ed to explain the meaning of reviewing the whole record for substantial evidence to
support the agency action:
[Trhe requirement for canvassing "the whole record" in order to ascertain sub-
stantiality does not furnish a calculus of value by which a reviewing court can
assess the evidence. Nor was it intended to negative the function of the Labor
Board as one of the agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience
to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field
carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore
must respect. Nor does it mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise
a court may displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views,
even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the
matter been before it de novo. Congress has merely made it clear that a re-
viewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial,
when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the
body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.
Id. at 488.
Despite all the statements by the courts, it remains difficult to specify the meaning of
substantial evidence. When is evidence substantial? It is possible that the question can
only be answered on a case-by-case basis. Comprehensive research and analysis of a
large number of cases might, however, show what courts do when they apply the test.
Such research might also reveal the content of the standard and the minimum levels of
substantiality for each kind of case.
202. 420 F.2d at 647.
203. Id. But the Board had exercised its discretion by refusing to grant relief on
Hamad's evidence. The Kordic court's formulation of the two-step process, see note 201
supra, clearly relates the exercise of discretion to the facts; denials of relief would be
considered a form of discretionary action.
204. Before Hamad, the analysis was suggested in United States ex rel. Kordic v.
Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967). See note 201 supra.
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variant of the two-step analysis20° and another has indicated it would
consider the possibility of adopting the analysis when the issue is prop-
erly before the court..20 0
A problem with the Hamad analysis is that it finds its basic precedent
in Wong Wing Hang,207 a section 244(a) case. As noted earlier, 20 8
section 244(a) has precise factual eligibility criteria and is thus distin-
guishlablc from section 243 (h); the former section lends itself to the two-
step analysis applied by the Wong Wing Hang court. Whether the same
analysis is as functionally applicable to a statute with few factual stan-
dards and which closely interweaves matters of fact and discretionary
action is arguable.20 9 In theory, it is incorrect for a court to speak of
findings of fact in 243(h) cases; the findings requirement was eliminat-
ed in 1952 to increase the Attorney General's discretion. 10 In practice,
however, the Service and Board structure most of their opinions to
present at least those facts that support the action taken.2 11
205. Shkukani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 435 F.2d 1278, 1380 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971). The court said that the "record amply
justifi[edl the Board's finding," and that "since the Board found that the petitioner had
not sustained his burden, it had no occasion to exercise its discretion" to grant relief. Id.,
citing Hamad.
206. Khalil v. District Director of the United States Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 457 F.2d 1276, 1278 n.4 (9th Cir. 1972).
207. See notes 156-62 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 163-64 supra and accompanying text.
209. Assuming that the two-step analysis is applicable to § 243(h) cases, other
questions arise. Must the INS and the Board use the same analysis in making their
decisions? The Board has taken the position that the Hamad approach applies "largely
in relation to the scope of judicial review." Matter of Dunar, Interim Decision No.
2192, at 21 (April 17, 1973). See also notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text. Also,
how can the courts properly evaluate a case in which the INS has relied upon
confidential information that is not even on the record before the reviewing court? Given
the difficulties facing many aliens in producing evidence, see text accompanying note 185
supra, what weight should be given to an alien's conclusory statements and speculation?
How extensively should judicial notice of conditions in other countries be employed?
210. See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text.
211. A reading of many Board cases suggests that it is common administrative
practice for the immigration judge to counter the alien's claims with reasons, some based
on evidence introduced by the INS or the alien himself, why persecution is not to be
anticipated. To the extent that this informal rebuttal procedure is used to justify the
denial of relief, it might be characterized as a finding of fact. But see note 199 supra.
The authors of the standard treatise on immigration law and procedure describe and
reject the Hamad analysis:
other courts have suggested that judicial review of such determination con-
sists of two steps: first to determine whether the rejection is supported by sub-
stantial evidence that the likelihood of persecution is established; second if like-
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Perhaps the most compelling argument for a Hamad type analy-
sis follows from the Foti212 decision. If, as the Court suggested in
dictum, section 106(a) places original jurisdiction for judicial review of
243(h) cases in the circuit courts,2 13 then, arguably, review should be
pursuant to the section 106(a)(4) standard of substantial evidence on
the record. In fact, the Court suggested that analysis for section 244
cases in a footnote.214 The weakness of this argument lies in the above
noted distinctions between sections 243(h) and 244(a).
The few courts that have adopted substantial evidence review have
not carefully considered its dynamics or reasons for its use. If the
language of Wong Wing Hang,2" as adopted by Hamad,210 is applied,
the INS would appear to be required to base any denial of relief upon
substantial evidence of nonpersecution. Thus, if the alien failed to meet
his burden of persuasion, the INS would still be required to introduce
evidence showing that he would not be persecuted.217 Or, when the
alien met his burden of persuasion, the Service would have to rebut with
substantial evidence of nonpersecution. But even if the INS failed to
lihood of persecution is established, whether there was abuse of discretion in
rejecting that application. LThis] . . . view seems unsound, since the persecu-
tion claim, in which the statute makes the Attorney General's "opinion" de-
cisive, does not appear susceptible to division between the statutory eligibility
and discretionary aspects of other relief. The sounder approach appears to re-
quire treating the entire persecution claim as one discretionary package. More-
over, it is unlikely that the Attorney General would direct deportation to a
place where he believes persecution would occur. And it is hardly likely the
courts would endorse such a direction. The recognition of the discretionary
character of the proceeding actually does not prevent the courts from reviewing
such determinations with care, taking into account the grave issues presented.
2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRAMON LAW AND PROCEDURE § 8.17b, at 84 (Supp.
1976) (footnotes omitted). But see text accompanying note 86 supra (Board recognition
of possibility of denial "on purely discretionary grounds").
212. Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
213. Id. at 229.
214. Id. at 228-29 n.15, quoted in note 158 supra.
215. 360 F.2d at 717-18; see text accompanying notes 156-62 supra.
216. 420 F.2d at 646.
217. One authority suggests the contrary. "When the party having the burden of
proof fails to produce evidence which the tribunal believes, the finding must be in favor
of the opposing party, even if the opposing party has produced no evidence." 4 K.
DAvis, supra note 201, § 29.06, at 148. Although Prof. Davis' assertion may accurately
reflect the case law, it is logically difficult to equate the alien's failure to meet his burden
of proof of persecution with the Service's showing of nonpersecution. The alien's failure
of proof may be more a function of the difficulty of obtaining evidence than of the
unlikelihood of persecution. This point is academic, however, if abuse of discretion,
rather than substantial evidence, remains the effective scope of review. See text accom-
panying note 218 infra.
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produce the required substantial evidence, it could deny relief,218 an
exercise of discretion that would be reviewed under the second step, the
abuse of discretion test. Thus, the interposition of the substantial
evidence review seems to have added nothing; the effective standard of
review remains abuse of discretion.
It might ippear that courts should apply only the substantial evidence
scope of review in section 243 (h) cases, discarding abuse of discretion
review altogether. Although this procedure would have the advantage
of clearly requiring courts to review the evidence, it would ignore the
predominant discretionary element of the statute.
The Hamad analysis is thus mistaken. It has little benefit for the
alien ' '"' and does not address the correct standard of review in a truly
discretionary statute-abuse of discretion. The proper issue in section
243(h) cases remains the meaning of abuse of discretion. If that
standard of review includes some degree of review of the evidence,220 it
might be argued that the Attorney General abuses his discretion when
relief is not granted to the alien whose claim, having met the requisite
burden of persuasion, goes totally or ineffectively unrebutted by the
Service. This situation would be more likely to occur if the burden of
persuasion, traditionally maintained at difficult levels,22' such as a
"probability" or "clear probability"'22 of persecution, is reduced to a
more reasonable standard, such as a "well-founded fear of possible perse-
cution." ' ,
5. Conclusions
This discussion of the scope of review in section 243(h) cases may
not be of great relevance to the larger field of administrative law. The
218. To argue that the failure of the Service to produce substantial evidence of
nonpersecution would foreclose a denial of relief effectively reads discretion out of §
243(h), a jesult Congress clearly did not intend. See notes 34-41 supra and accompany-
ing text
219. ' here might be some benefit to the substantial evidence standard of review
insofar ,s it requires the making of a complete record in all hearings.
220, See notes 152-53, 169 & 181-84 supra and accompanying text.
221. See notes 185-99 supra and accompanying text.
222. See notes 188-96 supra and accompanying text.
223. This suggested standard is in accord with the United Nations Protocol on
Refugees to which the United States is a signatory. See notes 264-69 infra and
accompanying text. The Board has refused to apply this reduced standard. See text
accompanying notes 288-90 infra.
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section gives the Attorney General great discretion and provides few
standards for judicial review. Moreover, the Administrative Procedure
Act is not directly applicable. The section 243(h) cases may, there-
fore, be sui generis.
Nonetheless, the manner in which the courts have analyzed the
243(h) cases may reflect judicial behavior in other administrative law
matters. The court with a 243 (h) case must decide initially how much
discretion is vested in the Attorney General. This process was particu-
larly evident in the early cases such as Dolenz224 and the statutory
construction cases of the 1960's.225 After discerning the limits of
discretion, the court will use the substantial evidence 220 or abuse of
discretion 227 scope of review. Whether there is any difference between
the two standards as applied cannot be determined from the section
243(h) cases. In other contexts, however, it is often asserted that the
substantial evidence test "afford[s] a considerably more generous review
than the 'arbitrary and capricious' "or abuse of discretion tests. -28 Other
courts and commentators have found no significant difference. 22D
Given this confusion of authority and the ability of the courts to
manipulate verbal formulae to reach preferred results, it might be
224. See notes 95-98 supra and accompanying text.
225. See notes 129-51 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 200-23 supra and accompanying text.
227. See notes 157-80 supra and accompanying text.
228. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967).
229. See, e.g., Wood v. United States Post Office Dep't, 472 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1973).
In Wood, the court observed:
Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, our review is confined to the
question of whether there is a "rational basis" in the evidence for the conclu-
sions and inferences which the service drew. If we were to apply the substan-
tial evidence test, we would seek to determine whether "a reasonable mind
might accept [the evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion" or inferences.
• . . It is questionable whether different quantities of evidence would be
needed to fulfill these two standards.
Id. at 99 n.4. Two commentators have similaily noted that "in an evidentiary context
the level of required support seems about the same whether the 'substantial evidence' or
'arbitrary' test is used." Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Prod-
ucts Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A.L REv. 899, 935 n.138 (1973). Scalia and Goodman
discuss the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 706(2) (A), (E) (1970). They observe that
the "substantial evidence" test has acquired a vague reputation as the more de-
manding standard of review without appreciation of the fact that it is only ra-
tionally applicable to an "on-the-record" proceeding. . . . The essential con-
straint of the "substantial evidence" test is not that it requires a higher degree
of support for an agency determination . . . but rather, that it requires this
support to be contained within the confines of the public record. ...
Id. at 934.
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desirable for courts, when possible,230 to discard the two terms and look
simply to the rationality of the evidentiary basis for the agency's deci-
sion. This approach would not limit the courts' ability to shape the
course of review. By adjusting the burden of persuasion and shifting the
burden of production at appropriate times, courts could continue to
balance considerations of agency convenience and expertise against the
needs and circumstances of the person subject to agency action. Policy
factors underlying the allocation of these burdens could thus be articu-
lated without the verbal contortions often found in distinguishing and
applying the substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards.
VI. EVIDENCE PATTERNS
Since the courts, whether reviewing for substantial evidence or abuse
of discretion, do look at the evidence in the record, it is important to
understand what kinds of evidence have under the prevailing burden
of persuasion been insufficient to produce a reversal of the Service's
or Board's denial of relief. Similarly, it is necessary to explore the kinds
of evidence the Board finds to be significant or insignificant in its deci-
sions which often go unreviewed by the courts. The following patterns,
singly or in combinations, have been used as evidence of the limited
likelihood of future persecution or have been insufficient evidence of
past persecution to permit reversal: (1) church membership or attend-
ance in a communist country, or affiliation with a minority religious
group in other nations-in both cases coupled with no personal persecu-
tion while respondent was living in the country in question;23' (2) no
230. See note 229 supra.
23 1, E.g., Kerkai v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 217
(3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1067 (1970) (Catholic in Hungary); Sadeghza-
deh v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 393 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1968) (Catholic
minority in Iran); Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir.
1967) (Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey); Morin v. Bouchard, 311 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1962) (church membership in Yugoslavia); Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.
1962) (church attendance in Yugoslavia); Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961) (religious beliefs in Yugoslavia); Zupicich v. Esperdy,
207 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), alf'd, 319 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
933 (1963) (Catholic in Yugoslavia); Sunjka v. Esperdy, 182 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1961) (Catholic in Yugoslavia).
In Zupicich and Lena the courts distinguished between persecution of the individual
and inimical state action directed against the church proper or its hierarchy. Only the
former sufficed to establish the particularized, individual persecution required by §
243(h). The distinction may, in reality, overlook the communal or associational
significance of religious affiliation and activity to many individuals. It is hard to
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prior arrest or persecution of the alien or his family; 232 (3) permission
to depart from or return to native country without incident or renewal
of passports;233 (4) sufficient governmental stability, safeguards, or
police protection such that violence against the respondent by individu-
als or mobs is unlikely;2as (5) imprisonment for nonpolitical crimes,
including the attempt to seek asylum in the United States;285 (6) no past
or future foreclosure from all employment;2 6 (7) speculation regarding
see how any state action that substantially impaired the ability of a religious hierarchy to
meet the congregational and individual religious needs of its members could not be
construed as persecution affecting the individual.
232. E.g., Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967);
Morin v. Bouchard, 311 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1962); Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th
Cir. 1962); Zupicich v. Esperdy, 207 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 773
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1963); Granado Almeida v. Murff, 159 F. Supp.
484 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (Cuban opponent to Batista dictatorship permitted to retain a
government job; several imprisonments for no more than a few hours each). In United
States ex rel Cantisani v. Holton, 248 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
932 (1958), the respondent introduced evidence that he had been physically attacked and
injured by communists in his native Italian village. The court permitted deportation
since the alien was not required to return to his village, but could go anywhere in Italy.
233. E.g., Asghari v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir.
1968); Hyppolite v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967);
Granado Almeida v. Murff, 159 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
234. E.g., MacCaud v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 500 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1974), see note 196 supra; Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 440 F.2d 100
(1st Cir. 1971); Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, 305 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1962).
235. E.g., MacCaud v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 500 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1974); Kerkai v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 217 (3d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1007 (1970) (arrest in Hungary for overstaying visit
in United States not a basis for granting relief); Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.
1962); Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961);
Zupicich v. Esperdy, 207 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afrd, 319 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1963); Civadelic v. Bouchard, 185 F. Supp. 439 (D.N.J.
1960); United States ex rel Miletic v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization,
108 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
It is likely that for some aliens an attempt to obtain asylum in the United States
would not be greatly appreciated by their native governments. The attempt to find
asylum is often a political act, and subsequent imprisonment, therefore, is quite clearly
persecution for expression of political opinion. Of course, the INS and the courts
probably fear that the granting of relief in many such cases would open the door to a
flood of claims, many of little merit.
236. E.g., Kerkai v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 217
(3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1067 (1970); United States ex rel. Kordic v.
Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
The Kovac result that persecution is the "deliberate imposition of substantial economic
disadvantage" is more reasonable than requiring the deprivation of all economic advan-
tages and employment opportunities. 407 F.2d at 107.
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a future takeover of the government by communists; 237 (8) antigovern-
ment activities or denunciations of native country's government while in
the United States;23 8 (9) the continued nonpersecution of the alien's
family in his native country after he seeks asylum in the United
States;239 (10) possible military service in the native country;2 40 (11)
refusal to join the governing party or participate in party activities; 41
and (12) no prior political activity by alien in his native country.2 42
A survey of reported Board decisions provides some indication of
what factual circumstances are adequate for the Board to stay deporta-
tion. Many cases conform to the evidence patterns set forth in the
237. E.g., Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.2d 750 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968) (Hong Kong falling to the People's
Republic of China); Cakmar v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1959) (Turkey overrun by
Russia). In Holz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 309 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1962),
the respondent argued that he would be persecuted since West Germany might send
him on to his native Romania. The court found no evidence that that would happen.
238. E.g., Scheiber v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 520 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Hamad v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Hosseinmardi v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 405 F.2d 25 (9th
Cir. 1969); Asghari v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir.
1968); Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
This is possibly the most problematic area under § 243(h). An alien who will be
persecuted for his statements and actions while in the United States would clearly seem
to be the victim of political persecution. But if relief were generally allowed in these
cases, aliens from many countries could enter the United States, make a few perfunctory
antigovernment statements, and be assured of a stay of deportation. The statute would
become relatively meaningless. The Blazina court pointed toward a possible solution.
There the alien made his statements only in the United States and had done nothing in
Yugoslavia. Thus the Board or a court might be justified in granting relief when the
alien could show antigovernment actions in his native country as well as the United
States. This approach, however, has two flaws. Proof or disproof of antigovernment
actions in the native country would often be very difficult. Second, the extent of the
repression in the alien's native country might be so great that any reasonable person
would not engage in antigovernment activities until well beyond its boundaries.
239. E.g., Siu Ftng Luk v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 801 (1969); United States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, 248 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932 (1958); United States ex rel. Miletic v. District
Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 108 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
240. E.g., Petrovic v. Pifliod, 282 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1960); Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F.
Supp. 24 (S.D. Tex. 1963), af 'd, 340 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1964).
241. E.g., United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967);
Morin v. Bouchard, 311 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1962); Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th
Cir. 1962); Civadelic v. Bouchard, 185 F. Supp. 439 (D.NJ. 1960).
242. Eg., Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1962); Blazina v.
Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); United States ex
rel. Miletic v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 108 F. Supp. 719
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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preceding paragraph,243 and relief has been denied. Other cases, how-
ever, present unusual claims, an analysis of which underscores the
Service's very narrow construction of the section. For instance, foreign
policy considerations sometimes appear to carry more weight than the
respondent's evidence. 244  Restrictions on individual freedoms are not
necessarily considered to constitute persecution. 2"4 Thus, in In re Sur-
zycki,246 the Board stated:
[tihere are many totalitarian governments in the world today which do
not brook dissent of any nature. We do not feel that an alien who
feels compelled -to espouse in his native country beliefs which are
looked upon with disfavor by his government is thereby being persecut-
ed if the government acts against him. 247
The Board also usually construes the section to require that the
persecution be "at the hands of the government, unless the government
243. E.g., In re Tan, 12 L & N. Dec. 564 (1967) (Indonesian citizen of Chinese
descent not persecuted while living in Indonesia; allowed to leave the country without
difficulty; family still in Indonesia and not seriously injured in anti-Chinese riots); In re
Kojoory, 12 I. & N. Dec. 215 (1967) (no prior persecution; family not persecuted;
nonpolitical while in Iran; antigovernment activities in United States insufficient to stay
deportation); In re Ngheim, 11 I. & N. Dec. 541 (1966) (antigovernment statements
while in United States insufficient); In re Banjeglav, 10 1. & N. Dec. 351 (1963)
(imprisonment for desertion of ship is not persecution); In re Cavlov, 10 I. & N. Dec. 94
(1962) (nonpolitical; family not persecuted).
244. In re Lee, 13 L & N. Dec. 236 (1969); In re Liao, 11 I. & N. Dec. 113 (1965).
See note 97 supra and accompanying text. Gordon and Rosenfield suggest that the
language of the statute makes it
clear that this determination involves the exercise of the Attorney General's dis-
cretion. Moreover, in requiring an appraisal of conditions in a foreign country
the statute to some extent contemplates a political decision in which the ex-
ecutive finding may be entitled to dominant weight.
1 C. GoanoN & H. RosENFmL, supra note 2, § 5.166, at 5-123 to 124 (1972) (footnotes
omitted).
245. See, e.g., In re Liadakis, 10 L & N. Dec. 252 (1963) (Greek law would cause
the Jehovah's Witness alien to be imprisoned if he fulfilled his religious duty to
proselytise). The Board stated that
[allthough at times particular aspects of questions arising under section
243(h) should be considered in the light of standards in this country rather
than those in the country in question, we do not believe the statute contem-
plates that unless aliens will enjoy within their own country the same type, de-
gree, and extent of religious and individual freedom they enjoy here deporta-
tion may be withheld .... Wherever possible, consistent with the purposes
of the statute, considerable latitude should be extended to the foreign law.
Id. at 254-55.
246. 13 L & N. Dec. 261 (1969). The case involved a Polish intellectual in the
United States for advanced study.
247. Id. at 262; accord, In re Tayeb, 12 L & N. Dec. 739 (1968).
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cannot control the persecutors. ' 248  Thus, the chance that the alien
would be injured in ethnic conflict, either as an intended victim or
innocent bystander, is insufficient to constitute persecution "when there
is a reasonable showing. . . that the government in power does make
an attempt to control such incidents. 249 Persecution must be directed
at the particular individual because of his race, religion, or political
beliefs. 2" °  The Board has also been inclined to believe that the alien's
248. In re MacCaud, Interim Decision No. 2226, at 8 (Sept. 7, 1973).
249. In ie Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 567 (1967) (Chinese minority in Indonesia
subject to mob persecution); accord, In re Rodriquez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 488, 490 (1964)
("The provisions of this statute do not cover injuries which may befall one who happens
to be in the vicinity of an outbreak of mob violence, even though the mob is aroused by
factors commonly associated with persecution of the nature outlined"); In re Eusaph, 10
I. & N. Dec. 453 (1964) (Moslem feared persecution in Hindu India because of India-
Pakistan conflict over Kashmir).
But see Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 440 F.2d 100 (lst Cir. 1971). In
Rosa. the court looked to the legislative history of the 1965 amendments to § 243(h), see
notes 41-49 supra and accompanying text, and found no evidence to suggest that
Congress intended to distinguish between persecution by governments and other groups,
at least when "a strong minority has sufficient de facto political power to carry out its
purposes without effective hindrance." Id. at 102.
250. In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (1967); In re Diaz, 10 I. & N. Dec. 199 (1963).
Dia7 involved a supporter of former Dominican Republic dictator Trujillo. He claimed
he would be a victim of mob action as an innocent bystander or as a result of mistaken
identity. The Board said that § 243 (h) covered neither of these possibilities.
In the aftermath of the American CIA-induced assassination of Trujillo and the
collapse of his government, many of his police and military personnel sought refuge in
the United States. In In re Torres-Tejeda, 10 I. & N. Dec. 435 (1964), a former head of
the Dominican secret police argued that he would probably be killed by a mob, and, even
if he were tried for his crimes, could not get a fair trial. Id. at 437. The Board
denied relief and took administrative notice of the decline of mob violence in the
Dominican Republic (this was a year before the American invasion to restore stability);
the Board also said it "believe[d]" the respondent would get a fair trial. Moreover, the
Board thought the alien's police activities were not so political in nature that their
punishment, probably by death, would constitute physical persecution. Id. at 439.
In re Stojkovic, 10 I. & N. Dec. 281 (1963), involved an alien who had escaped from
Yugoslavia and, while living in France, was hired as a mercenary for Trujillo and given
Dominican citizenship. After the fall of Trujillo, he was arrested, imprisoned, and then
put on a plane with his Dominican passport and a ticket to France. The Board refused
to accept the respondent's argument that he had been deported since he had been
allowed to keep his passport. Id. at 283. The Board went on to speculate that the
alien had retained all Dominican civil rights, that upon his return to that country
he would be imprisoned but only briefly as before, and that he would probably be
allowed to leave again or he would be deported. Id. at 284-86. The Board provided
no foundation for its speculation. On the point of the respondent's fear of mob violence,
the Board meiely noted that he had suffered no such violence in the past. The Stoikovic
opinion can hardly be called reasoned; the instance of this sort of decision alone should,
given the grave consequences of persecution, be sufficient to inspire closer judicial
scrutiny of denials of § 243 (h) claims.
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low status, for example, a farmer or office clerk, in his native country
makes it unlikely he will be subject to persecution. 5 1
In addition to its narrow construction of section 243(h), the Board
appears occasionally to have been inconsistent in its evaluation of evi-
dence. Thus, although it rejects speculation or conclusory statements by
aliens, the Board has occasionally lapsed into speculation about the
consequences of deportation in order to find that no persecution will
result.
2 12
In another case the Board gave weight to a witness' testimony about
political conditions in a country she had not visited in nine years, 20 but
in a nearly concurrent case gave no weight to the similar testimony of
a witness who had last visited the country in question five years ear-
lier .2 , 4 Although in many cases the Board will look to the nonpersecu-
tion of the alien's family as evidence that the respondent will not be
persecuted, in In re Bukowska2 55 the Board passed over without signifi-
cant comment the alien's father's problems with Polish authorities.
These examples should not be taken as criticism of the Board: the fault
lies in the statute whose standards are so imprecise that the Board must
resort to largely subjective evaluations of the evidence. 5 0
The handful of cases in which the Board has granted a stay of de-
portation reveal no distinct evidentiary patterns. In In re Joseph257 the
Haitian respondent presented evidence of his involvement in antiDuval-
ier politics in Haiti and the United States and of his imprisonment and
beatings (shown by scars) in Haiti. The Board took administrative
notice of the conditions in Haiti and said that the evidence of the alien
and his witnesses established a clear probability of persecution. In In re
Janus and Janek258 the aliens testified to their opposition to the Czech
251. E.g., In re Diaz, 10 L & N. Dec. 199 (1963); In re Cavlov, 10 I. & N. Dec. 94,
96 (1962).
252. Compare In re Tayeb, 12 I. & N. Dec. 739, 742 (1968) (failure to produce docu-
mented evidence), and In re Perez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 603 (1964) (speculation), wlith In
re Vardjan, 10 I. & N. Dec. 567 (1964), and In re Stejkovic, 10 I. & N. Dec. 281 (1963)
(speculation by Board).
253. In re Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 200 (1967) (Poland).
254. In re Kojoory, 12 . & N. Dec. 215 (1967) (Iran).
255. 10 I. & N. Dec. 49 (1962).
256. Consequently, Congress should amend § 243(h) to provide clearer standards, or
courts should exercise closer scrutiny of Board decisions.
257. 13 I. & N. Dec. 70 (1968).
258. 12 . & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
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government, their defection and antigovernment propaganda, and their
conviction in absentia for defection. Despite the Board's attempt to
distinguish politically and nonpolitically motivated refugees and their
conviction under defection statutes,259 the case remains difficult to
distinguish from many earlier ones in which relief was denied. 260 Two
other cases in which the Board granted relief involved a Cuban refu-
gee " and an Egyptian Jewish physician.262
This description of cases is most helpful in suggesting what is not
sufficient evidence to obtain section 243(h) relief. The cases them-
selves tell us very little about the quality and amount of evidence the
alien must present. Clearly he must show a substantial probability of
persecution, generally by a government. The alien must also show that
he will be singled out for the persecution. If the alien can document
past antigovernment activity and persecution of himself and his family,
relief is more probable than if he merely speculates on future events. It
would also seem that the respondent's burden of persuasion is lighter if
his native country is one not recognized by the United States, such as
Cuba, or is out of favor, such as Haiti.263 The burden is virtually im-
possible when the country at issue is a military ally, for example, Taiwan,
or a major trading partner, such as Iran. Given these political realities
and the distinct problems confronting the alien in documenting his claim,
it is arguable that section 243 (h) is at best only a form of selective relief.
At worst, it is an instrument of foreign policy, largely unrelated to the
original, presumably humanitarian, intent of Congress. This conclusion
may explain why the number of reported 243(h) cases has declined
significantly in the last five years.
259. Id. at 876-77.
260. See note 235 supra and accompanying text.
261. In re Alfonso-Bermudez, 12 I. & N. Dec. 225 (1965). The respondent testified
about his antiCastro activities in Cuba and his difficulty leaving the country. The special
inquiry officer and Board took administrative notice of the kind of government existing
in Cuba. Id. at 227.
262. In re Salama, 11 I. & N. Dec. 536 (1966). The Board described Egyptian
discrimination against its Jewish population.
263. Recently, however, the Service has become reluctant to grant § 243(h) re-
lief to Haitian refugees. See Paul v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975). In Paul, both the Service and the Fifth Circuit ignored
the alien's claim of substantial persecution in Haiti and reasoned that the respondents
had fled Haiti to obtain employment and better living conditions in the United States.
The Paul case should be read in conjunction with a popularized account of the INS-
Haitian refugee problem. Powers, The Scandal of U.S. Immigration: The Haitian
Example, Ms., Jan. 1976, at 62.
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VII. UNITED NATIONS PROTOCOL ON REFUGEES
Perhaps as a result of the limited success of the litigated claims under
section 243(h), a few cases have recently arisen under the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 204 adopted by the
United States in 1968, which incorporates the 1951 Geneva Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.265
The Convention, as modified by the Protocol, defines a refugee as one
who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons for race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.266
Article 32, section 1, of the Convention requires that "[t]he Contract-
ing States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on the
grounds of national or public order. '26 7 Finally, Article 33, section 1,
requires that
[njo Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationali-
ty, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.20,
An alien in the United States must make a request for asylum under
the Protocol to the INS which conducts a hearing to determine the facts.
The facts as there established are forwarded to the Department of State
for an opinion about whether refugee status should be granted, and the
264. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. no. 6577.
265. 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 19 U.S.T. 6260.
266. Art. I, § a(2), 189 U.N.T.S. 152, 19 U.S.T. 6260, 6261, as modified by Art. 1. §
2, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225.
267. 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 19 U.S.T. 6260, 6275 (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 176, 19 U.S.T. 6260, 6276. Article 31, § 1, id. at 174, 19 U.S.T. 6260,
6275, covers some refugees illegally in a contracting state:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where
their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of the article, enter or are
present in their territory without authorization, provided they present them-
selves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal
entry or presence.
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INS notifies the alien of the State Department decision.20 9 At least two
cases have been litigated in which the alien has attempted to claim
refugee status under the Protocol. In a third case the Board has dealt
with the impact of the Protocol on Section 243(h).
In Kam Kan Lin v. Rinaldi270 alien crewmen overstayed the twenty-
nine day limit of their conditional entry permits. All were natives of
mainland China, and they were ordered to be deported to Hong Kong.
After the deportation hearings they filed their claims under the Protocol,
all of which were denied by the State Department.27' In seeking
review, 2 72 the plaintiff aliens, who clearly were not "lawfully" in the
country,2 73 argued that the Article 32 phrase "lawfully in their territory"
should not be defined as "'lawfully ...pursuant to the immigration
laws of that territory."' That construction would make the Protocol
"nugatory," for an alien "lawfully" in the United States would have no
reason to request asylum.274  The court rejected that argument by
noting that aliens "lawfully but temporarily present could apply for
asylum under the terms of the Protocol. 2 75 The court also looked to
the legislative history of the United States' adoption of the Protocol276
and the drafting of the Convention,2 77 which clearly indicated that
"lawfully" was to be construed according to the immigration or other
relevant law of each contracting state. Finally, in granting the Service's
motion for a summary judgment, the court stated
269. This process is described in China Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974).
In the case of Chinese who have fled the People's Republic of China and lived in
Hong Kong prior to seeking asylum in the United States, the State Department has
established a policy of denying all such requests so long as the alien will be deported to
Hong Kong and will be accepted there. These cases are handled by the INS without
referral to the State Department. 367 F. Supp. at 680-81.
270. 361 F. Supp. 177 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 874 (1974).
271. Id. at 179-82.
272. The plaintiff aliens claimed jurisdiction for review under 5 U.S.C. § 702-06
(1970). 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1970), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (1970). The court
appears to have found jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1970). 361 F. Supp. at 182.
273. 361 F. Supp. at 183.
274. Id. at 184.
275. Id.
276. S. ExEc. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968), cited in 361 F. Supp. at
185.
277. 361 F. Supp. at 186, citing Ad Hoe Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, Report, U.N.E.S.C.O.S.O.C., at 47, U.N. Doc. E/1618 Corr. 1; E/AC.
32/5 Corr. I (March 2, 1950); Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, Report, U.N.E.S.C.O.S.O.C. at 11, U.N. Doc. E/1850; E/AC. 32/8.
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it is apparent that, should aliens be granted asylum on the basis of
possible persecution with no regard to the legality of their entry, the
present immigration laws and quotas imposed by this country would be
devastatingly effected [sic].278
Chim Ming v. Marks27 9 involved similar facts, issues, and result.
Upon appeal, the Second Circuit, in affirming the federal district court's
decision, noted that Article 33 of the Convention28 ° protected even the
alien unlawfully in the United States from being returned to a country
where he would be persecuted. The court added that the protection pro-
vided by Article 33 was "further supported" by section 243 (h).81 The
court's opinion thus reflected an inherent conflict in the Convention as
construed by the courts. That is, the Convention applies primarily to
refugees lawfully in the country, but Article 33 prevents deportation of a
refugee unlawfully in the country to nations where his life or freedom
would be endangered. Since many potential refugees may enter the
United States unlawfully, and most nations are unwilling to accept
deportees other than their own citizens, the question of interest becomes
whether the Convention's definition of refugee282 when taken with
Article 33 supercedes or works a liberalization of section 243(h).
That issue was fully explored by the Board in In re Dunar288 and
answered in the negative. Dunar was a Hungarian citizen who had
entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor and had remained
longer than his visa permitted. At his deportation hearing he first
entered a section 243 (h) claim and then withdrew it and instead sought
refugee status under the Protocol. 28 4 In the first part of its opinion, the
Board studied the legislative history of the Protocol and other materials
and arrived at the lawful-unlawful presence distinction relied upon by
the courts in Chim Ming and Kan Kam Lin.28 i The Board therefore
found the respondent not to be eligible for asylum under the Protocol
because he was unlawfully in the country, even though he might,
278. 361 F. Supp. at 186. Ironically, after using this course of action the respondents
were cut off from seeking § 243(h) relief since the time for filing an application, 10
days, see 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1976), had passed.
279. 367 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974).
280. See note 268 supra and accompanying text.
281. 505 F.2d at 1172.
282. See note 266 supra and accompanying text
283. Interim Decision No. 2192 (April 17, 1973). For another discussion of Dunar,
see Note, supra note 185, at 143-47.
284. Interim Decision No. 2172 at 2.
285. Id. at 5-14.
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arguendo, be considered a refugee. 286 The Board maintained that to
allow an alien unlawfully in the country to claim Protocol protection
would undercut the quota system and permanent resident provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, something Congress could not
have intended. 28 7 Thus a refugee under the definition of the Protocol
and Convention could be deported, although not to a country where he
would be persecuted.
Dunar also argued that the definition of refugee in the Protocol and
Convention altered the breadth of coverage of section 243(h) and the
burden of proof required thereunder. Specifically, Dunar maintained
that all an alien now need show was that he had, in the Convention's
terms, "a well-founded fear of being persecuted;" thus his state of mind
was at issue, and he no longer needed to prove a clear probability of
persecution.288 The Board rejected that thesis by reasoning that since
the fear had to be "well-founded," it could not be "purely subjective. A
fear which is illusory, neurotic, or paranoid, however sincere does not
meet this requirement."2 89 The Board went on to say that
[s]ome sort of a showing must be made and this can ordinarily be done
only by objective evidence. The claimant's testimony as to the facts
will sometimes be all that is available; but the crucial question is
whether the testimony, if accepted as true, makes out a realistic
likelihood that he will be persecuted. The burden of coming forward
with the requisite evidence is obviously the claimant's. And if all he
can show is that there is a merely conjectural possibility of persecution,
his fear can hardly be characterized as "well-founded. '290
The Board also reasoned that the definition of refugee under the
Protocol, which added persecution by reason of "nationality" and
"membership of a particular social group" to 243(h)'s categories of
race, religion, and political opinion, did not create any conflict with
section 243(h)'s "beneficent purposes." That is, Congress intended to
protect aliens from "the actions of their own home governments in
singling them out for punitive treatment, not because of their individual
misconduct or demerits, but solely because they are members of dissi-
286. Id. at 14.
287. Id. at 14.
288. Id. at 15.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). It is unclear whether the Board was saying that the
alien had, under the Protocol, a burden of persuasion measured as a "realistic likelihood"
rather than the "clear probability" or similar standards under § 243(h). The former
might, in theory, be lighter.
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dent or unpopular minority groups."2 91 Thus the Protocol was entirely
compatible with section 243(h) and did not enlarge its coverage.
Finally, the Board confronted Article 33 of the Convention which
prohibits the deportation of any refugee to a country where his "life" or
"freedom" would be threatened for any of the reasons set out in the
definition of refugee. 9 ' The Board felt there was no real conflict with
section 243(h). "We are satisfied that distinctions in the terminology
can be reconciled on a case 'by case consideration ....""'
Dunar then argued that Article 33 allowed the Attorney General no
room to exercise discretion; that is, its provisions were mandatory and
therefore clearly conflicted with section 243(h) which has been con-
strued to give broad discretion to the Attorney General. The Board
maneuvered around this problem with murky reasoning: The cases
that speak of "broad discretion" "contemplate the manner in which
the Attorney General arrives at his opinion and the limited scope of
judicial review, rather than the eligibility--discretion dichotomy"
found in section 244 cases.294 Those cases that apply the same dichoto-
my to section 243(h) have done so in relation to the scope of review.295
The entire 243(h) process is a discretionary determination of the proba-
bility of persecution.296 Once the likelihood of persecution is estab-
lished, deportation is stayed; there have been no cases in which relief has
been denied after sufficient proof of probable persecution.297 Thus there
is no conflict with the mandatory relief under Article 33, under which
the probability of persecution must also be established.
The Board's construction of the Convention, which effectively trans-
mutes it into section 243 (h), has not yet been tested in a reported court
decision, so that the Dunar analysis might be vulnerable. "Well-founded
fear" need not be read as narrowly as the Board would wish. Fear is a
subjective condition, and under the Convention it is an element that
must be considered. Fear plus some evidence or grounds therefor can
be construed and applied to create a much more reasonable burden of
persuasion for the alien than the rigorous "clear probability" standard.
Such a lightened burden would be more realistic given the problems of
291. Id. at 17.
292. See note 266 supra and accompanying text.
293. Interim Decision No. 2192 at 18.
294. Id. at 20.
295. Id. at 21.
296. Id., citing G. GORDON & H. RosmENw, supra note 2, § 5-16b, at 5-124 (1972).
297. Interim Decision No. 2192 at 22.
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supplying objective evidence confronting the alien. Any alien attempt-
ing to argue that "well-founded fear" is a lighter burden should,
however, carefully search the history of the drafting of the convention
for evidence of the framers' intent. In addition, the practice of other
contracting states in construing the phrase must be investigated.
In addition, the Board is arguably incorrect in stating that Article 33
does not affect the Attorney General's discretion. The Article is
couched in absolute terms "No Contracting State shall expel or return
. ..a refugee in any manner whatsoever.. ." to countries where his
"life or freedom would be threatened." 98  Section 243(h), however,
merely "authorizes" the Attorney General to withhold deportation when
in his "opinion' persecution is likely. Thus, despite the Board's disclaim-
ers in Dtnar and in the absence of strict judicial review, section
243(h) can permit a discretionary decision to deport when the likeli-
hood of persecution exists. That discretion cannot co-exist with the
language of the Article. Indeed, it has been argued that the Protocol
supersedes section 243(h).2 99  At the very least, Article 33 could be
read to require the Service to rebut the alien's proof which has satisfied
the burden of persuasion. Moreover, such a duty to rebut would reduce
the possibility that the Service could make a purely discretionary deci-
sion-perhaps on the bases of political consideration, undisclosed infor-
298. 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176, 19 U.S.T. 6260, 6275; see text accompanying note 263
supra.
299. Note, supra note 185, at 151-52:
If any section of the Immigration and Nationality Act is ripe for superces-
sion. it is section 243(h).. . . Repeal by implication, which would be re-
quired in this case, is not favored by the courts, and requires a "positive repug-
nancy" between the terms of the statute and treaty. But where the enactments
cover the same area, and it is not possible to give effect to both, a later enact-
ment must prevail if it is self-executing. This is particularly true where that
enactment is broad and its terms are clear and explicit so that it can be seen
to cover the entire area.
The terms of article 33 meet the supercession requirements. First, both it
and section 243(h) cover the same area: the prevention of expulsion of a ref-
ugee to a country where he will be subjected to persecution. Second, the requi-
site "positive repugnancy" exists between the concepts "well-founded" fear of
persecution, and "clear probability of persecution." Because the "well-
founded" concept would require a lesser burden of proof, the requirements of
article 33 should be less stringent than those of section 243(h). Third, it does
not appear possible to give effect to both enactments without radically altering
the interpretation of section 243(h) or watering down article 33. Finally, the
United States adhered to the Protocol, a self-executing treaty, after Congress
enacted section 243(h).
Id. (footnotes omitted). The author of the Note also argues that Article 33 grants a
refugee a "substantive right," while § 243(h) creates only "procedural" rights, for
example, the right to a hearing. Id. at 146 (emphasis original).
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mation, or State Department recommendations-to return the alien. The
absolute language of the Article thus requires a decision on the record
and reduces, if not eliminates, any latitude in the exercise of discretion.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Section 243(h) vests significant discretion in the Attorney General
and his delegates in an area of ultimate importance-literally, life and
death-to a small number of persons each year. Although the courts
have imposed a few constraints on the exercise of that discretion, they
have generally given the Attorney General great latitude in its exercise,
despite the nature of the individual interests involved and the paucity of
standards within the statute to guide him. It is possible that the
ineffectiveness of judicial review in section 243(h) cases has limited the
significance of the section as a form of relief for refugees; certainly the
number of reported cases has declined markedly in the last half-decade.
This fact raises the question of whether section 243(h) has become a
virtual nullity. If so, that is contrary to what the Board in Dunar
described as Congress' "beneficent" intention. But what was the con-
gressional intent? At best the legislative history is unclear. It can only
be supposed that Congress did not intend to legislate a nullity, that
Congress placed the section in the Act to provide meaningful relief for
individuals fleeing what they reasonably perceived to be persecution. 00
If section 243(h) is not to become and remain meaningless, one of
three things must occur. First, Congress could amend the section to
supply functional standards; in the process, Congress should make its
intent clear. Second, Congress or the courts could reduce the burden of
persuasion on the alien. Finally, litigation designed to test the conform-
ity of section 243(h) with the Protocol and Convention could lead to
important changes in the application of the section. In any case, there
is a need to make more reasonable the burden of proof upon the alien.
Without that, section 243(h) is likely to become a meaningless sen-
tence buried in the Act.
Finally, it must be asked whether a rational system of political
asylum, open to all persons with cognizable claims, is compatible with
an immigration policy based on quotas and restricted entry.80 1 A
300. See note 50 supra.
301. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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relatively open and equitable policy for refugee relief would obviously
undercut the quota system. Moreover, it is unlikely that a fair and
meaningful policy toward refugees is compatible with America's present
role as a superpower.3 02  That role necessitates political alliances, re-
lationships, and conflicts that may very well render it impossible for
the United States to serve as a humanitarian refuge for some of the
world's displaced.
302. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
